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It is obviously no longer controversial that the American political system,
especially at the national level, is seriously dysfunctional. Consider, for example,
what are nearly the opening words-after noting that the United States Capitol
is currently enfolded by scaffolding for repair of the physical building-of the
distinguished Columbia political scientist and historian Ira Katznelson's recent
contribution to a Boston Review forum on "Anxieties of Democracy."' Even if
"[r]estoration is underway, its conclusion in sight," repair of the institutions
inside the Capitol seems a long way off, if it is even possible.
2 Katznelson
continues:
The House and Senate are presently shackled. Paralyzed by party
divisions, influenced excessively by moneyed interests, and perverted by
the disappearance of civic virtue, representative institutions appear
unable to identify and address our most consequential public problems,
including the politics of redistribution, racial equity, immigration, and
the proper balance between liberty and national security. Like the dome,
American democracy badly needs reconstruction.3
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1. Ira Katznelson, Anxieties ofDemocracy, Bos. REV. (Sept. 8, 2015), http://bostonreview.
net/forum/ira-katznelson-anxieties-democracy [https://perma.cc/8EY2-7TXU].
2. Id.
3. Id. (At the time of this publication, the restoration of the U.S. Capitol Dome has
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Depending on one's place along the political spectrum, one might see
different examples of the particular failings of Congress-and, for that matter, of
the presidency and judiciary. Those on the right presumably are not so upset that
the only interest most of Congress has in "the politics of redistribution" is to take
from the less well-off and give to the wealthy via tax cuts and continuing
subsidies disproportionately received by the well-off. As I write this opening
missive, on September 28, 2015, Real Clear Politics, aggregating a number of
recent polls, indicates that while approximately fifteen percent of the public
"approves" of Congress, seventy-five percent does not.4 The "direction of
country" data indicates that only very slightly more than a quarter of polled
Americans believe the country is heading in the right direction, while sixty-three
percent (including yours truly) believes we continue on a downward slope.s
Katznelson offers a fairly familiar litany of examples of what "shackle[s]" our
present system, including polarization, the obscene role played by money in the
overall electoral process, and, interestingly enough, "the disappearance of civic
virtue."' With regard to the last of these, one can well wonder exactly when a
sufficient supply of such virtue in fact graced our political order. One can
scarcely understand the Publian7 argument for adoption of the Constitution as
resting on a robust confidence in the virtue of the populace at large. Were that the
case, one might have expected something other than the exclusive reliance on
representatives and the absolute shackling of the public at large with regard to
any direct participation in governance.' There is a reason, after all, that Publius
takes great pride in, and indeed capitalizes, what he regards as one of the
strongest features of the new constitutional order: "THE TOTAL EXCLUSION
OF THE PEOPLE, IN THEIR COLLECTIVE CAPACITY," from any share in
actual governance.' Decisions are to be made only by those deemed, with
whatever empirical accuracy, the "representatives" of the people.o But, of course,
an important aspect of the initial Publian schema is that these representatives
concluded and the scaffolding removed; however, the metaphor employed by Katznelson, alas, still
remains all too apt.)
4. CongressionalJob Approval, REALCLEARPOL., http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/
other/congressional job-approval-903.html [https://perma.cc/W3LD-X6P2] (last visited Nov. 8,
2016).
5. Id.
6. Katznelson, supra note 1.
7. See SANFORD LEVINSON, AN ARGUMENT OPEN TO ALL: READING THE FEDERALIST IN THE
21sT CENTURY (2015) (noting that Publius was the pen name chosen by Alexander Hamilton, John
Jay, and James Madison when they collaborated on writing the 85 essays comprising The
Federalist).
8. THE FEDERALIST No. 63 (James Madison).
9. THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 373 (James Madison) (Isaac Kranick ed., 1987); see also
LEVINSON, supra note 7, at 240-41.
10. Id.
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would in fact be markedly "better" than their constituents." They not only would
be more sophisticated about the ways of the world, but also, and more
importantly, more disposed to tame the inevitable and ineradicable urges of self-
interest, delineated most sharply in The Federalist No. 10, and to be guided
instead by the demands of the public good.12 That vision of "enlightened"
representation seems far in the past; the only serious debates are whether the
Publian vision ever made much sense and when it collapsed, perhaps with the
emergence of the first party system around 1796," the rise of mass political
parties during the Jacksonian Era,'4 or the rise of the modem mass-and then
social-media state in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries." (You certainly
know far more about this last than I do, and, of course, much of your previous
work also emphasized the crucial role of social movements in understanding the
actualities of American constitutional development. 16)
As you no doubt can predict, given our many conversations (and joint
seminars) on the general subject of the state of the American politics, what upsets
me about Katznelson's analysis-and, for that matter, the responses offered by
a variety of talented academics and social activists-is that none of them, save,
perhaps for Helene Landemore,17 comes close to addressing the possibility that
among the cause of our present discontents is the institutional order created in
1787 and left remarkably unchanged since then." It is especially telling that this
failure of imagination is found in a symposium that is quite obviously dominated
by persons of leftish sensibilities." They are, after all, fully aware of the
deficiencies of our present political system and believe that reform-generally of
11. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 128 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) ("[A]nd
the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to centre in men who possess the
most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters.").
12. Id. at 125.
13. See NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, ON THE SIDE OF ANGELS: AN APPRECIATE OF PARTIES AND
PARTISANSHIP 89-94 (2010) (outlining how the Federalists hoped "to abolish factions and unite all
the parties for the general welfare").
14. See Jacksonian Democracy, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/jacksonian-
democracy [perma.cc/WA27-9ECV] (last visited Nov. 8, 2016).
15. See ROSENBLUM, supra note 13, at 341 (summarizing the effect that modem focus on
media by "would-be party builders" has inhibited the possibility of a sustainable new political party
that could rival the current two-party system).
16. See generally Jack M. Balkin, The Last Days of Disco: Why the American Political
System is Dysfunctional, 94 B.U. L. REv. 1159 (2014).





19. See Katznelson,supra note I (referencing published responses from Larry Kramer, David
M. Kennedy, Mark Schmitt, Rick Perlstein, Mohammad Fadel, Michael C. Dawson, Helene
Landemore, Michael Gecan, Martin O'Neill, Nadia Urbinati, Melissa S. Williams, Alex
Gourevitch, and Richard Trumka).
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the kind that I presume both of us would favor-is necessary.20 And there was a
time, of course, when leftish critics were also at the same time critics of the
Constitution itself.21 Perhaps they accepted, rightly or wrongly, the Beardean
understanding22 that it was intended to-and did-operate to serve particular
economic interests, none of them identified with the working class (or, even more
certainly, that subset of the working class called slaves). Or perhaps they were
angry at the totally unjustifiable power given small, usually rural, states in the
Senate. It is surely no coincidence, to adopt a classic formulation of the left, that
Socialist Representative Victor Berger,23 representing Milwaukee early in the
twentieth century, believed that popular election of senators, achieved via the
Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, was far inferior to the out-and-out abolition of
that egregious institution. Again, one might agree or disagree with him, just as
one might or might not agree with, say, Teddy Roosevelt, who campaigned in
1912 on the platform that the American electorate should be given the right to
overturn offensive judicial decisions by popular referendum.24 The point is that
the agenda of political reformers once included "constitutional reform" in a sense
far different from supplicating judges for attractive decisions.25 But that has been
lost, save, interestingly enough, for certain members of the Tea Party who would
like, for example, to repeal the Seventeenth Amendment2 6 (not to mention the
Sixteenth Amendment licensing the federal income tax).27 That spirit seems
20. Id.
21. See generally Robert W. Gordon, The Struggle over the Past, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 123
(1996) (detailing examples of the evolving legal theories of "classic" and "progressive" liberalism
in contrast to the "New Right" and paradigmatic back-and-forth use of the Constitution to further
one side's cause or blunt the other's).
22. See CHARLES AUSTIN BEARD, 1 EcoNOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES 325 (1913) ("In the ratification, it became manifest that the line of cleavage
for and against the Constitution was between substantial personalty interests on the one hand and
the small farming and debtor interests on the other. The Constitution was not created by 'the whole
people' as the jurists have said; neither was it created by 'the states' as Southern nullifiers long
contended; but it was the work of a consolidated group whose interests knew no state boundaries
and were truly national in their scope.").
23. Wants Senate Abolished: Berger of the House May Be Disciplined for Criticism in
Resolution, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1911, at 8.
24. President Theodore Roosevelt, Candidate for President in 1912, A Charter ofDemocracy
Speech before the Ohio Constitutional Convention (Feb. 21, 1912) (transcript available through the




26. Evan McMorris-Santoro, Tea Party-Backed Repeal of the 17th Amendment Gets
Republicans into Trouble, TALKING POINTS MEMO (May 14, 2010, 8:13 PM), http://
talkingpointsmemo.com/dc/tea-party-backed-repeal-of-the-17th-amendment-gets-republicans-into-
trouble [https://perma.cc/5DQR-ZH4A5].
27. Brian Beutler, 5 Constitutional Amendments that Constitution-Loving Tea Partiers
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completely absent in the contemporary left, including that portion of the left
represented (or, some would say, over-represented) in the legal academy. Thus,
as you know, my principal caveat with regard to the book you co-edited with our
friend Reva Siegel for the American Constitution Society (ACS) (which I am glad
to support)-The Constitution in 202028-was devoted exclusively to judicially-
managed reform and had no discussion at all of the possibility that members of
the ACS should actually ask if we need something that judges cannot in fact
provide, which is fundamental institutional change.
29
Let me stop now. I trust I have said enough to initiate this epistolary
exchange that also serves as our contribution to the symposium in Indianapolis
on "Partisan Conflict, Political Structure, and Culture.""o There is much to be said
about American political culture; as Mark Graber" has sometimes suggested, we
may need new kinds of citizens rather than a new Constitution." Similarly,
partisan conflict of the kind analyzed by, say, Norman Ornstein and Thomas
Mann,33 is surely worth a great deal of emphasis. But I hope that "political
structure" does not get lost in the conversation. Are we well served by the set of
structures created in 1787, and could we do better? I believe that the answer to the I
first question is clearly no, and I am agnostic about the possibility of doing better.
But we will never know unless we begin a full-scale conversation about what
institutional transformation might actually involve.




It might be useful to organize the issues raised by your initial comments into
three sets of questions.
First, is the United States presently in a period of political dysfunction? What
Would Change, TALKING POINTS MEMO (Oct. 28, 2010, 12:41 PM), http://talkingpointsmemo.
com/dc/5-constitutional-amendments-that-constitution-loving-tea-partiers-would-change
[https://perma.cc/KY68-E7LD].
28. See generally JACK M. BALKIN & REVA SIEGEL, THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020 (2009).
29. Id.
30. See supra note *.
31. See, e.g., Mark A. Graber, The Countermajoritarian Difficulty: From Courts to Congress
to Constitutional Order, 4 ANN. REV. L. Soc. Sci. 361, 366-67 (2008).
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., THOMAS MANN & NORMAN ORNSTEIN, IT'S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS
(2012) (stating Congress has become stalled due to both parties moving to left and right sides,
rejecting bi-partisanship, and becoming passionately adverse).
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features or aspects of the political system evidence this dysfunction or are
themselves dysfunctional?
Second, is there a better way to describe our current set of problems than
political dysfunction?
Third, are our present problems caused by hard-wired features of the
American Constitution, or are they caused by other features of the constitutional
system? Is a constitutional amendment or a new constitutional convention the
appropriate remedy for these problems, or would other kinds of remedies prove
more effective or appropriate?
I. IS THE PROBLEM DYSFUNCTION?
You begin by asserting that no one seriously doubts that the United States is
currently in a period of political dysfunction. But I think the question is far more
difficult. That is because the term "dysfunction" is quite ambiguous.
If "dysfunction" means that politicians are unable to perform the ordinary
tasks of governance, it is by no means clear that the national government is
dysfunctional. It all depends on whose perspective you are taking. The Debt
Ceiling Crisis of 2011 caused enormous anxiety.34 Yet it led to the Budget
Control Act of 2011,35 which, if you are a Republican, was an enormous policy
success because it slowed the growth of federal spending. Again, if you are a
Republican, you might well rejoice in the fact that the percentage of the
workforce employed by federal, state, and local governments has significantly
decreased during Barack Obama's presidency,36 although, as a Republican, you
34. Jack M. Balkin, The Not-So-Happy Anniversary of the Debt-Ceiling Crisis, THE
ATLANTIC (Jul 31, 2012), http://www.theatIantic.com/politics/archive/2012/07/the-not-so-happy-
anniversary-of-the-debt-ceiling-crisis/260458/ [perma.cc/WGV6-4TA2].
35. Budget Control Act of2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, 125 Stat. 240 (codified as amended in
scattered titles of the U.S.C.).
36. See, e.g., Drew Desilver, Job Shifts Under Obama: Fewer Government Workers, More
Caregivers, Servers and Temps, PEw RES. CTR. (Jan. 14, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2015/01/14 /job-shifts-under-obama-fewer-govemment-workers-more-caregivers-servers-and-
temps/ [https://perma.cc/5T7J-2XMG] ("Private payrolls have added 7 million jobs over Obama's
presidency, while government payrolls (federal, state and local) have contracted by a combined
634,000 jobs."); Ben Walsh, Here's An Obama-Era Legacy No One Wants to Talk About:
Government Jobs Have Fallen, HUFFINGTON PosT (Aug. 5, 2016), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/entry/obama-austerity-legacy-jobsus_57a499ece4b03ba68012032b
[https://perma.cc/4695-42HF] ("The decline has come at the state and local level. It coincides with
state and local budgets around the country being slashed. Federal public sector jobs have been
basically flat for the past eight years-if you strip out the temporary bump for the hiring of short-
term workers once a decade for the census."); Joshn Zumbrun, The Federal Government Now
Employs the Fewest People Since 1966, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 7, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/
economics/2014/11/07 /the-federal-government-now-employs-the-fewest-people-since- 1966/
[https://perma.cc/P4LS-YL9N] ("As a share of the total workforce, the federal government's hare
of civilian employment is the lowest since World War II.").
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might be loath to give Obama credit for this.
If by dysfunction you mean that the President and Congress do not seem to
agree on anything these days, the upcoming 2016 election would seem to provide
an easy cure. Simply elect a Republican to the White House, end the legislative
filibuster, and the problem is solved. Then the national government would be like
many state governments with one-party rule. These governments are able to pass
a great deal of legislation. Many of these reforms are ill-advised, but that does not
mean that these state governments are dysfunctional. It means only that
democratic governments sometimes produce very unwise policies.
Now if the thought of a Republican Congress headed by President Trump,
Rubio, or Jeb Bush disturbs you far more than the status quo, it is not clear to me
that what you really are worried about is dysfunction. That is because you are
presumably delighted that Obama (and forty-six Democrats and independents in
the Senate") stand ready to prevent Republicans from dismantling not only
Obamacare, but large chunks of the New Deal and the modem welfare state.
Rather, your real objection is to policies that you dislike. Your problem is that a
substantial percentage of the American public disagrees with you about public
policy and does not want the same things that you want. Your problem is not
dysfunction-it is control (or blocking) by your political opponents.
Perhaps the problem boils down to the concern that the U.S. government is
dysfunctional because (pending the results of the 2016 election) it is easier to
push policies in a direction Republicans like, and it is harder to push them in a
direction that many Democrats like. That may not in fact be true, but even if it
were true, one would then have to couple this claim with the (contestable)
assertion that the Democrats, for all their faults, are closer to the real or genuine
interests of the public and of democracy generally, regardless of what the opinion
polls say. But I am not sure that the best way to describe this state of affairs is
political dysfunction.
Perhaps by "dysfunction" we mean polarized parties and irresponsible
politicians. One might point to bitter ideological division between the two major
political parties, and to the remarkably irresponsible economic views held by one
of them (I will not say which one!) which block a rational response to our current
economic problems. Yet the United States weathered the greatest challenge of the
past decade-The Great Recession-far better than most other Western
democracies, including those with parliamentary systems that do not have the
multiple veto points that the U.S. Constitution has." For all of the inanity of our
37. Party Division in the Senate, 1789-Present, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/
history/partydiv.htm [https://perma.cc/CKY3-GSA6] (last visited Nov. 11, 2016).
38. See, e.g., Marilyn Geewax, U.S. Economic Recovery Looks Good Compared With
Sluggish Europe, Asia,NPR(June 17,2016),http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/
2 016/06/17/
482328208/u-s-economic-recovery-looks-good-compared-with-sluggish-europe-asia
[https://perma.cc/iJUS3-X8HR] ("the OECD says that compared with our chief competitors, the
United States is leading [the Euro Area and Japan in its recovery from the Great Recession]-by
miles."); Maria A. Arias & Yi Wen, Recovery from the Great Recession Has Varied Around the
World, FED. REs. BANK OF ST. Louis (Oct. 2015), https://www.stlouisfed.org/-/media/
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political classes, and the many veto points in our system, we must be doing
something right.
Or we might identify "dysfunction" with lack of public trust in government.
One might point to the public's loss of trust in the federal government and the
general sense (judging from recent public opinion polls39) that the country is
moving in the wrong direction. But as Steve Griffin points out in his recent book
on constitutional dysfunction, the public has been losing trust in government for
many decades, going back to the 1960s.40 This decline began long before the
period that one might assert is the present period of dysfunction.4 Perhaps even
more embarrassing, much of the decline begins during a period of great
achievement for democracy and equality in the United States.42 It is precisely
when government becomes more equal, fair, and open that Americans begin to
lose trust in their government.43 Pessimism about the country's general direction
is not the same thing as lack of trust in government. Such pessimism about the
country's general direction tends to fluctuate with the business cycle and with the
state of the economy, and may also vary depending on party affiliation.4 4
Finally, I should note that my own view, outlined in my essay The Last Days
of Disco,45 is that what we are calling dysfunction is actually transition between
constitutional or political regimes. The Republican regime that has dominated
American politics since 1980 is nearing its end. Although the Republicans still
dominate Congress and state legislatures,46 the two parties are increasingly evenly
matched, and demographic shifts, as well as a continuing civil war within the
Republican Party, appear to be sapping the Republicans' long dominance.47
Eventually a new regime will emerge, and when it does, people will stop
complaining how dysfunctional our system is, just as they stopped complaining
about dysfunction during Roosevelt's and Reagan's presidencies.48
Calling our system "dysfunctional," then, may not clarify matters because it
runs together several phenomena: (1) polarization; (2) venality; (3) idiocy; (4)
Publications/Regional%20Economist/2015/October/recession.pdf[https://perma.cc/B2TW-N9PQ]
(finding the GDP growth of the United States was higher than Western Europe).
39. Trust in Government: 1958-2015, PEw RES. CTR. (Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.people-
press.org/2015/11/23/1-trust-in-government-1958-2015/ [https://perma.cc/4RM6-7WYX] ("The
public's trust in the federal government continues to be at historically low levels. Only 19% of
Americans today say they can trust the government in Washington to do what is right 'just about
always' (3%) or 'most of the time' (16%).").
40. STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, BROKEN TRUST: DYSFUNCTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 76 (2015).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 80.
43. Id. at 90-91.
44. Id. at 10.
45. Balkin, supra note 16, at 1160-61.
46. Id. at 1169.
47. Id. at 1170.
48. Id. at 1172.
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ineffectiveness (given a particular political perspective or ideology); (5) lack of
representativeness; and (6) transition between constitutional regimes. This brings
me to the second question. Is there a better way to describe our current set of
problems? I believe there is.
II. THE PROBLEM Is DEMOCRACY, NOT DYSFUNCTION
The term "dysfunction" suggests that some function of government is not
working properly.4 9 But the term remains ambiguous until we specify what the
relevant function is. Government might be dysfunctional because it does not
function well as a government-for example, because it can not make decisions,
because it can not appropriate and spend money, because it can not raise or
support troops, or because it can not respond to crises like the Great Recession.
I have suggested above that none of these are really the case. Or government
might be dysfunctional because it fails at a different criterion: it does not function
well as representative government.
The latter, I think, is the real issue. To be sure, our present degree of
polarization and political conflict naturally causes people to confuse the question
of representativeness with the question of efficacy, but the two questions are not
the same. An efficacious government need not be representative and it can feature
a great deal of polarization and conflict. Indeed, an efficacious government can
exacerbate polarization and conflict precisely because it is efficacious in a
particular way or in a particular direction. During the Obama Administration, for
example, the government made significant reforms to the health care and
financial systems; these reforms seem to have made polarization worse, not
better. Conversely, a representative government that truly reflects the diverse
opinions of Americans may not be particularly efficacious or efficient.
Moreover, if, as I believe, we are in a period of transition between regimes,
we should expect a considerable amount of angst about democracy and worries
that government no longer works as well as it once did. These concerns tend to
happen precisely during such periods of transition.o Think of the period between
1928 and 1933, for example, or the period between 1978 and 1984. These
worries, however, will likely resolve themselves over time as the Reagan regime
breaks down and is replaced by a new regime-whether one dominated by
Democrats or Republicans." If that is what people mean by dysfunction, it is only
a temporary problem.
Nevertheless, there is a quite different concern that is wrapped up in our
current anxieties. I believe that it is a real problem, one that needs a solution, and
that it will not be solved simply by waiting things out. But this problem is not
primarily a problem of efficacy or a problem of polarization, although it may
exacerbate both phenomena.
The big problem that we face today is that our system of democratic
49. See generally GRIFFIN, supra note 40.
50. Id. at 1160-61.
51. Id. at 1160-61, 1192-93.
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representation is broken.52 The system of representation is not broken because it
fails to produce winners and losers who claim to represent us. It produces plenty
of winners and losers, and politicians endlessly insist that they are working the
people's will and doing the people's business. Rather, the system of
representation is broken because it is seriously undemocratic and unrepublican.
It is undemocratic because it is not responsive to public opinion. It is
unrepublican because it is not fairly representative, allows too much self-
entrenching behavior, is deeply corrupt, and is not directed at the achievement of
the public good."
To be sure, this is a kind of dysfunction. After all, one of the functions of a
democratic government is to be democratic. The function of a republican
government is to represent the public and serve the public good. Our current
system of government is defective in both respects. But we should not confuse
this kind of dysfunction with the claim that the government can't get certain
things done. Thus, instead of talking generally about political dysfunction, we
should focus on what is really at stake-democracy and republicanism. The
question we should ask is what features of our current system are deeply and
pathologically undemocratic or unrepublican.
You have been arguing about these issues for a long time, Sandy-long
before the current controversies over government dysfunction.54 Indeed, even if
our system of government was efficacious, I believe that you would still object
that it is not sufficiently democratic. Our current political unhappiness merely
gives you the opportunity to call for reforms that you would have advocated
regardless of the public's current degree of satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with
their government.
Your previous work has tended to equate the question ofpolitical dysfunction
with the question of how directly and rapidly our institutions respond to public
opinion," and especially with how easy it is for the public to change directions
through legislation or through initiative or referendum." That is why you are
skeptical of the presidential veto, for example. But, as noted above, we should not
run together questions of democracy and representativeness with questions of
efficacy. That is because relatively undemocratic and unrepresentative systems
52. Id. at 1190.
53. The republican political tradition is quite complicated and has both desirable and
undesirable elements. For a summary of its constitutional relevance today, see Jack M. Balkin,
Which Republican Constitution?, 32 CONST.COMM. 31 (2017); JackM. Balkin, Republicanism and
the Constitution of Opportunity, 94 TEx L. REv. 1427 (2016). In this discussion, I use the term
"republican" to describe the admirable features of the republican tradition that emerged from its
synthesis with liberalism and that were embraced by the Constitution's framers.
54. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND How WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006).
55. Sanford Levinson, The United States and Political Dysfunction: "What Are Elections
for?, " 61 DRAKE L. REv. 959 (2012).
56. Sanford Levinson, How the United States Constitution Contributes to the Democratic
Deficit in America, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 859, 874 (2007).
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can function very effectively. In many respects the United States was
undemocratic and unrepublican by today's standards throughout most of its
history. Although it sometimes functioned quite badly-think only of the period
leading up to the Civil War-it also often functioned quite well. (Indeed, if you
think that the Jacksonian period was a period of increasing democracy, that was
also the period that brought us closer to civil war.)
I agree with you that there are features of our political system that are deeply
and unfairly undemocratic. The most important is our system of campaign
finance, and relatedly, our system of lobbying and access to representatives. A
second problem is the urgent need to reform our representational and voting
systems. Even without reforming the malapportioned Senate, there is much we
could do to reorganize democratic politics, make registration and voting easier,
and increase participation.
These undemocratic and unrepublican features of our system do not
necessarily make it dysfunctional from the standpoint of efficacy. There have
been long periods of time in the United States in which wealth and capital
dominated political agendas and in which either a large percentage of orditary
people were disenfranchised or their votes and voices were unfairly neglected and
ignored. These periods of time include periods that most people. would not
consider dysfunctional, even though there was also a significant amount of party
polarization.
I also do not think that reforming campaign finance and voting will
necessarily make government more efficient or effective. It may or may not lead
to wiser decisions. These reforms may not make polarization go away, or increase
public trust. If Steve Griffin is right, then making government more accountable
and transparent may actually increase public distrust." I am not at all sure that
these reforms will prevent showdowns like the confrontations we have seen in the
past eight years. What they will tend to produce is not less dysfunction, but more
democracy-or at least a more fairly representative government.
Perhaps equally important, even if we focus on the question of democracy as
opposed to efficacy, you and I might disagree about different features of our
system and their relative importance. For example, I do not find the presidential
veto a particularly serious problem, while you do." I do not think that moving up
the date of Inauguration Day is all that important, while you have repeatedly
pointed to it as a defect of our Constitution." Finally, although I agree that the
Senate is drastically malapportioned, I do not think that abolishing it is a very
high priority, while it is a major concern of yours. I might choose a different mix
of reforms: some might be more "republican"-seeking to improve representation
57. See GRIFFIN, supra note 40, at 75-78 (connecting loss of trust in government with
increase in civil rights and civil liberties, which made politics more divisive and made government
malfeasance more salient).
58. See Sanford Levinson, Against the Veto, NEw REPUBLIC (Oct. 9, 2006),
https://newrepublic.com/article/64983/against-the-veto [https://perma.cc/U6V6-YM8K].




in different areas, preventing self-entrenchment, and rooting out political
corruption. Others might be more "democratic"-facilitating mass participation
and the practical ability to vote.
II. Is THE HARD-WIRED CONSTITUTION THE PROBLEM?
These differences in priorities bring me to the third set of questions. Are the
anti-democratic (or anti-republican) features of our government primarily caused
by hard-wired features of the U.S. Constitution, or by other causes? And what is
the appropriate remedy for these problems?
Here it is important to make a distinction between the constitutional order and
the hard-wired Constitution."o The constitutional order is the entire set of rules,
doctrines, and practices that structure political decision making in the United
States." The hard-wired Constitution consists of those rules embedded in the
document that cannot be changed except by constitutional amendment.6 2
Your work has tended to equate constitutional reform with altering the hard-
wired Constitution.6 3 This requires either Article V amendment or a new
constitutional convention.6 4 That may be because you think that the most
important problems with the Constitution come from its hard-wired features.
By contrast, I do not believe that the most serious problems with our system
come from its hard-wired features. Most of the constitutional order is not hard-
wired. Therefore, I also do not believe that the most important reforms to our
constitutional order require Article V Amendment or a new constitutional
convention. I have no objection to either-I am not, like some of our colleagues,
an amendment-phobe or a convention-phobe. It is just that I do not believe that
these are the appropriate cure. We can reform some of the most important features
of our constitutional system through statutory changes. For example, we can
move from single member districts in the House to other forms by ordinary
statute. States can change their voting, registration, and redistricting systems
without a federal constitutional amendment. Even some features of the system
that seem hard-wired, like the Electoral College, can be worked around through
ordinary politics. For example, states can bargain around the Electoral College
through an interstate compact ratified by Congress." To be sure, pushing for new
60. Balkin, supra note 16, at 1162-64 (distinguishing between the hard-wired Constitution
and the Constitution of construction).
61. Id. at 1166.
62. Id. at 1163.
63. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 55, at 981 ("1 have come to believe that the most
important aspects of any constitution are the hard-wired structures within which politics takes
place.").
64. Id. at 980-81.
65. See AKHILREED AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND
PRINCIPLES WE LIVE By 457-61 (2012); Vikram David Amar, Response: The Case for Reforming
Presidential Elections by Subconstitutional Means: The Electoral College, the National Popular
Vote Compact, and Congressional Power, 100 GEO. L.J. 237, 254-58 (2011).
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amendments or a new convention may raise public support for statutory or
administrative solutions that do not require supermajority votes in the Congress
and the states. So pushing for amendments may sometimes be politically
advantageous to achieving strategies that do not require amendments.
Another example is the current dysfunction in the House of Representatives,
in which the Speaker is repeatedly forced to engage in political brinksmanship
before finally allowing essential legislation to pass with Democratic votes. The
problem stems from internal rules of the Republican Caucus. The "Hastert Rule,"
for example, is a political convention under which the Speaker of the House
refuses to allow a vote on legislation supported by a majority of the House unless
a majority of his or her party's caucus also supports it." In addition, current
House rules effectively prevent any Republican Speaker from being elected
without the consent of the House's Freedom Caucus; this holds the Speaker
hostage to the House's most ideologically extreme elements."
These difficulties are not due to the hard-wired Constitution. Although
Article I, Section 2, Clause 5 of the Constitution prescribes that "[t]he House of
Representatives shall choose their Speaker and other Officers,"" it does not
specify how this is to be accomplished. There are any number of non-
constitutional reforms that would prevent the current system of dysfunction we
are witnessing in the House.
Some reforms, especially in the area of campaign finance, may require
changes in constitutional doctrine. Constitutional amendment is probably the least
effective way to achieve them. Changing doctrine normally requires that judges
change their minds or, more likely, that new presidents appoint new judges. If one
amends the Constitution but leaves the same judges in place, there is the risk that
the judges will neuter the changes. That is why Franklin Roosevelt decided to
focus on new judicial appointments instead of Article V amendments.
6 9
I agree with you that law professors tend to focus obsessively on the work of
judges and pay less attention to questions of constitutional design. I agree that
they should shift more of their attention to questions of constitutional design. It
does not follow, however, that they should shift their attention to Article V
66. Balkin, supra note 16, at 1166.
67. Sarah Binder, This Is How the Freedom Caucus Has Taken the House Hostage, WASH.
POST (Oct. 12,2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/
2 015/10/12/this-is-
how-the-freedom-caucus-has-taken-the-house-hostage/?utm-term=.13925e2c4833
[https://perma.cc/CE66-4HJN] (describing how the Freedom Caucus used the vote for Speaker to
control the House's political agenda).
68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
69. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fireside Chat, THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, (Mar. 9, 1937),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15381 [https://perma.cc/WH25-9EPP] ("Even if an
amendment were passed, and even if in the years to come it were to be ratified, its meaning would
depend upon the kind of Justices who would be sitting on the Supreme Court bench.").
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amendment, much less to a new constitutional convention. Rather, they should
focus on features of the constitutional order that can be modified both at the state





As always, you raise a number of excellent questions. We may disagree less
than you think, but where we do disagree may be important (especially from the
perspective of those interested in the symposium of which these exchanges are
a part). Indeed, in the interim between my first letter and this, the House of
Representatives has been thrown into chaos by the joint phenomena of the
apparent resignation by Speaker John Boehner" and the seeming inability of the
Republican caucus to agree on a successor who in fact is willing to take that
thankless job." [Since these comments were written, the Republicans did settle
on Paul Ryan to be Speaker,72 but now the punditry speculates on whether he will
in fact be able to "tame" the Republican caucus," especially given his insistence
on adhering to the Hastert rule74 whereby he will refuse to bring up any
legislation that does not have the support of a majority of the Caucus.] How
indeed does one bring order to a group that is engaged in what increasingly
appears to be full-scale political warfare at least as much with fellow Republicans
as with the quite literally hated Democrats? It is difficult not to take quite literally
"current events" into account in terms of the wider analysis of "Partisan Conflict,
Political Structure, and Culture." Perhaps readers, knowing how the story has
turned out, at least provisionally, will use that knowledge to reinforce or cast
doubt on our own "real-time" analyses. But, of course, the greatest challenges
70. Jennifer Steinhauer, John Boehner, House Speaker, Will Resign from Congress, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/26/us/john-boehner-to-resign-from-
congress.html?_r-0 [https://perma.cc/KN6W-95FH].
71. Kelsey Snell, Why Paul Ryan Doesn't Want to Be House Speaker, WASH. PosT (Oct. 8,
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2015/10/08/why-paul-ryan-doesnt-
want-to-be-house-speaker/ [https://perma.cc/X9YN-HF3Y].
72. Deirdre Walsh, Paul Ryan Elected House Speaker, CNN (Oct. 29, 2015),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/29/politics/paul-ryan-house-speaker-vote/ [https://perma.cc/3RSH-
4JEE].
73. Scott Wong, Speaker Ryan Courts Conservatives, THE HILL (Jan. 26, 2016, 6:00 AM),
http://thehill.com/homenews/house/2 66890-ryan-seeks-to-court-conservatives
[https://perma.cc/2H97-FQET].
74. Balkin, supra note 16, at 1166.
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come when we bring to bear our techniques of analysis, whether strictly legal or
drawing on insights from political science, history, or whatever on immediate
events of great importance where we cannot, by definition, be confident of
outcomes.
Let me address your three points in turn:
I. "FUNCTIONALITY" AND "DYSFUNCTIONALITY"
First, as to the meaning of "dysfunctionality," you are absolutely right.
Perhaps, like most terms that we throw about in our political discourse-think
also of such favorites as "democratic" or "republican" forms of
government--"functionality" and "dysfunctionality" are what political theorists
call "essentially contested concepts."" The importance of such concepts lies not
only in the fact that smart people of good faith in many cases have disagreed for
literally centuries about their meanings, but also that there are positive or negative
valences attached to the terms themselves." Although in the eighteenth century,
relatively few theorists were willing to be identified as proponents of
"democracy," in the twenty-first century, its desirability is taken as a given,,
especially in what we still call "the West."7 7 It has become common to judge
existing countries by the degree to which they are sufficiently "democratic" and,
perhaps, even to intervene and overthrow existing leaders in the name of
furthering "democracy."7 8 So something rides, practically speaking, on whether
a particular system is identified as "democratic" or "undemocratic;" it is not
surprising, then, that partisans of one or another particular country (including the
United States, of course) will fix on self-serving definitions of "democracy," even
as their adversaries proclaim what may be quite different (and perhaps equally
self-serving) alternatives.
But I also want to say some specific things about "functionality" and
"dysfunctionality." Any supporter of an existing political order wants to be able
to describe it as "functional," even as opponents will claim just the opposite.
Your eminent Yale colleague David Mayhew is famous for arguing that Congress
is far more functional than many of us believe, and he proffers as evidence the
fact that even in times of divided government it is able to pass legislation, some
of it quite important.7 9 In his 2013 book, Partisan Balance: Why Political Parties
Don't Kill the U.S. Constitutional System," he simply lists an impressive number
75. See generally W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, in 56 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 167 (1955-1956).
76. Id.
77. See generally Katznelson, supra note 1.
78. J. Dana Stuster, Mapped: The 7 Governments the U.S. Has Overthrown, FOREIGN POL'Y
(Aug. 20, 2013), http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/20/mapped-the-7-govemments-the-u-s-has-
overthrown/ [https://perma.cc/3XK4-BWKZ].
79. See generally David R. Mayhew, Is Congress "the Broken Branch?," 89 B.U. L. REV.
357 (2009).
80. See generally DAviD R. MAYHEW, PARTISAN BALANCE: WHY POLITICAL PARTIES DON'T
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of bills that were passed during the 1980s and 1990s, when neither Democrats nor
Republicans were able to gain control of both branches of Congress plus the
White House." No one should ever dispute the accuracy of Mayhew's numbers;
he knows an almost unimaginable amount about American politics. That being
said, though, I have in my own book, Framed, criticized Mayhew, who regards
the list as a "knock-down argument," for being insufficiently attentive to the
extent to which the legislation he cites can be said truly to have confronted in
satisfactory measure the depth of the challenges facing us as a country.82 Not all
legislation, obviously, is good legislation.
And even Mayhew, incidentally, has agreed that the contemporary Congress
is quite different in major respects from that of the halcyon days of the 1980s and
1990s, for by any account far less legislation is being passed.83 The Voice of
America News itself reported in December 2013 that "[tlhe 113th Congress has
been the least productive in history, with the House and Senate passing only 57
bills that were signed into law by President Barack Obama,"84 and it correctly
predicted that things would get no better in the election year of 2014.
Republicans, of course, took over the Senate in 2015." To be sure, Congress
toward the end of 2015 was able to pass a bill designed to keep the government
functioning without another shutdown, " but this is surely to adopt an absolute
minimal standard for what counts as congressional functionality. Indeed, the
Republican Senate during 2016 is perhaps most noteworthy for quite literally
refusing to hold a single day of hearings on the nomination by President Obama
of Judge Merrick Garland to succeed Antonin Scalia, who had died in February
of 2016."
In any event, to put on a Band-Aid may count, from one perspective, as
KILL THE U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM (2011).
81. Id. at 69.
82. SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA'S FIFTY-ONE CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS
OF GOVERNANCE 235 (2012).
83. David R. Mayhew, The Least Productive Congress in History?, POLITICO (Dec. 23,
2013), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2013/12/least-productive-congress-in-history-
101476?o=0 [https://perma.cc/JT7P-WVK9].
84. Cindy Saine, US Congress in 2013 Passes Fewest Laws in History, VOICE OF AM. (Dec.
20,2013, 12:19 AM), http://www.voanews.com/content/us-congress-2013-passes-fewest-laws-in-
history/1814234.html [https://perma.cc/FNR6-YF34].
85. Id.
86. Stephen Collinson, Republicans Seize Senate, Gaining Full Control of Congress, CNN
(Nov. 5, 2014, 10:43 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/04/politics/election-day-story/ [https://
perma.cc/XJ7T-E6WR].
87. Erin Kelly, Obama Signs Funding Bill Averting Government Shutdown-for Now, USA
TODAY (Sept. 30, 2015, 9:55 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/09/30/senate-
approves-funding-bill-avert-government-shutdown/73032366 [https://perma.cc/NN28-CUG4].
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responding to an injury, but if major surgery is actually required, it would be
quixotic to offer the Band-Aid as evidence of a sufficient medical response. To
be sure, we may be far more often confident about medical diagnoses and
treatment plans than about politics. We often disagree about our most basic
descriptions of the political world (is there really a phenomenon called "global
warming" and, even if there is, is there a causal connection with presumptively
changeable behavior by human beings?); even if we agree on the descriptions, we
can then engage in almost endless political warfare about what count as adequate
responses. We are increasingly likely to disagree on the treatment plans, often
combining at that stage particularly both factual assertions-"it will never work,
or, indeed, be counterproductive"--with value statements as well-"it might
work, but only at the price of depriving us of our liberty or our prosperity."
In any event, it should be absolutely clear that one simply cannot present a
neutral notion of "functionality" or "dysfunctionality" without at the very same
instant taking a political position. The Affordable Care Act" is a fine example of
governmental functioning at its best if and only if one agrees with enough of its
factual and value premises. Ditto your own example of the "solution" to the Debt
Ceiling Crisis of 2011,90 which gave us, among other things, the lunatic "policy"
(scare quotes intended) of "the sequester,"" which takes a cleaver to almost all
government programs.
It is true, though, that I am mixing up two decidedly different notions of
"functionality" and "dysfunctionality," and you are right to call me out on it. That
is, with regard to the American polity since the takeover of the House by
Republicans in 2011,92 a basic reality is the near-impossibility of passing any
significant legislation.93 We have embraced a culture of low expectations by
giving Congress credit for managing, at the last minute, to prevent defaulting on
the national debt, even though the machinations required to avoid default
triggered a lowering by Standard and Poor's of the credit-worthiness of the
United States from the "gold standard" AAA to AA+.9 And in doing so,
89. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-48, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)
(codified as amended in scattered titles of the U.S.C.).
90. See Budget Control Act of2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, 125 Stat. 240 (codified as amended
in scattered titles of the U.S.C.).




92. Douglas Stanglin, Election Day 2010: GOP Wins House, Democrats Retain Senate, USA
TODAY (Nov. 3, 2010), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/politics/
2010-11-03-RW_
mainelection02_STN.htm [https://perma.cc/82PH-JZ3J].
93. See, e.g., Philip Bump, The 113th Congress Is Historically Good at Not Passing Bills,
WASH. POST (July 9, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/201
4/0 7/09 /the-
113th-congress-is-historically-good-at-not-passing-bills [https://perma.cc/KQ3F-MX9V].
94. Zachary Goldfarb, S&P Downgrades U.S. Credit Rating for First Time, WASH. POST




incidentally, Standard and Poor's referred not to the weakness of the U.S.
economy, still the world's strongest, but, rather, to doubts that had developed
about the adequacy of our political system." They were correct.
So take your question: Would the election of, say, Ted Cruz" bring
"functionality" back to American politics by leading to the passage of all sorts of
wondrous legislation by an invigorated Republican majority in the House and
Senate that would eagerly be signed by President Cruz? The answer is clearly yes,
if all we mean by functionality is the ability of Congress to pass legislation.
Perhaps this is the equivalent of praising the German army for functioning so well
in the blitzkrieg of 1939, when it quickly conquered Poland." But, obviously, the
second, and perhaps more controversial, aspect of defining "functionality" and
"dysfumctionality" now comes into play, for we must necessarily ask what
actually is being achieved, whether by legislation or by armies. Or, perhaps, we
must recognize that functionality along one dimension, whether legislative or
military, must be placed within the context of the wider system and the extent to
which the functionality in a limited domain leads overall to what we regard as a
"functional" or "dysfunctional" political order. Still, even there, values will
necessarily come into play. Surely most of us believe that Germany became a
"dysfunctional" political order well before late 1944 and 1945 when its leaders
recognized that they had so totally lost control of events that unilateral surrender
(and suicide) were the only viable options." For some of us, a "unitary
government" fashioned by a Cruz-dominated Republican coalition would be
enough to despair about the future of the United States (and the world) and to
entertain thoughts not only of emigration, but, far more seriously, of secession.
Why would we expect Pacifica, composed of California, Oregon, and
Washington, perhaps joined by Hawaii, to remain within such a Union?" A
serious secessionist movement, as distinguished from the "let's pretend" versions
that are rife within the United States would, presumably, be evidence of
dysfunctionality. But is that what it would take to overcome your argument that
the Cruz regime, however obnoxious, would demonstrate a capacity to govern
that would overcome the "dysfunction"-oriented analyses like my own?
II. "REPRESENTATION" AND "DEMOCRACY"
I begin with the titles of two books of mine: Our Undemocratic Constitution:
95. Id.
96. Or, as subsequently happened, Donald J. Trump.
97. Raymond Limbach, Blitzkrieg, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Apr. 23, 2015),
https://www.britannica.com/topic/blitzkrieg [https://perma.cc/MC9A-XSJX].
98. See generally Christian Goeschel, Suicide at the End ofthe Third Reich, 41 J. CONTEMP.
HIST. 153 (2006).
99. For such an argument following the 2016 triumph of Donald Trump, see Donny
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Where the Constitution Goes Wrong (and How We the People Can Correct It)
0o
and then Framed: America's 51 Constitutions and the Crisis of Governance."o
The first one, obviously, addresses whether the Constitution of 1787, left
remarkably unamended in relevant structural aspects, could possibly be described
as democratic using fairly standard-form, twenty-first century standards of
democracy.102 My answer is a resolute no, where the basis of comparison is not
only other constitutions from around the world, but, far more relevantly, the
constitutions of the fifty states, all of which are arguably more democratic than
their national counterpart.'os But the response to that book led me to the
conclusion that for most people their response was the equivalent of "so what?"
Many correctly pointed out that the framers were scarcely twenty-first century
Democrats and that was really fine. As the John Birch Society put it in the 1960s,
"We're a republic, not a democracy, and let's keep it that way."'
0 4 Even more to
the point, for many, is that our system was working quite well--or at least "good
enough"-to warrant praise rather than snarky condemnation based on essentially
contested conceptions of "democracy." The word "democracy" is capable of
describing a house of many with many differently-hued rooms, and what obtain
in the United States is certainly one of them, even if my own taste is considerably
different.
Thus the change in the later book, with its emphasis on "the crisis of
governance."' That there is such a crisis seems to be widely agreed; this is just
what it means to express deep worry about the "dysfunctionality" of the
American political system. But you describe at least some elements of this crisis
as likely to be quite transient, as discussed above. Still, it might well be the case
that a more "democratic" system, defined for our purposes as one in which the
national government faithfully reflects the policy views of electoral majorities
inasmuch as the minority no longer enjoys access to veto points that can block the
instantiation of these views, would itself generate such unhappiness as to lead to
a far deeper crisis of governance. This could be achieved by any genuine
movement toward secession or the greater frequency of mass movements coupled
literally with rioting in the streets. Regime change is no small matter, especially
if the proposed changes are deep and pervasive rather than relatively marginal.
The Reagan Revolution looks quite tame compared with the visions of the
Freedom Caucus'6 within the House of Representatives and others who might
100. SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION
GOES WRONG (AND How WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006).
101. LEVINSON, supra note 82.
102. See generally LEVINSON, supra note 100.
103. See generally id.
104. Gilbert Abcarian & Sherman M. Stanage, Alienation and the Radical Right, 27 J. POL.
776, 780 (1965).
105. See generally LEVINSON, supra note 82.
106. Tim Dickinson, Meet the Right- Wing Rebels Who Overthrew John Boehner, ROLLING




demand a great deal of effective say should a Republican win the White House
in 2016.
As the great Robert Dahl argued many years ago, democracy of the American
type, i.e., comprised of great numbers of diverse citizens (and, for that matter,
non-citizens), is always subject to the problems posed by groups who are
intensely antagonistic to one another and therefore indisposed to the compromises
that are thought to be necessary to pluralistic polities."' To overcome these
baleful possibilities, Dahl took refuge in the reality of "cross-cutting" cleavages,
where individuals were members of many different groups and organizations that
would put them in contact with individuals like them in some respects-their
liking for public support of culture, whether high or low-and very different in
others, such as their relative support for reproductive choice as against the right
to life.'"o
It has certainly been argued that an important development over the past
several decades, even as the total American population has in many ways become
ever more diverse, is the diminution of such cross-cutting cleavages. People seem
to be sorting themselves out more by reference to their major modes of
identification, even without conscious political gerrymandering that reduces the
possibility that centrist voters, pulled in different directions by their cross-cutting
associations, will dominate the electoral process. Perhaps the most vivid evidence
of this was provided by electoral maps following the 2012 presidential election.
Relatively few counties or, for that matter, congressional districts, were divided
51-47% between Barack Obama and Mitt Romney, even though that was the
national vote percentage.'0 9 States themselves deviated quite dramatically, of
course. Texas, for example, where I live, gave 57.2% of its votes to Romney."o
But even within Texas, very few counties tracked the state-wide percentages."'
Instead, Travis County, the home of the University of Texas, where I teach, gave
60.2% of its votes to Obama"2 even as most other counties were giving seventy
and even eighty percent of their votes to Governor Romney."3 In the battleground
state of Ohio, won by Obama with 51.1% of the popular vote, Obama obtained
107. See ROBERT DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: CONFLICT AND
CONSENT 338-39 (1968).
108. See id.
109. David Nir, Daily Kos Elections'Presidential Results by Congressional District for the
2016 and 2012 Elections, DAILY Kos (Nov. 19, 2012, 12:30 PM), http://www.dailykos.com/
story/2012/11/19/1163 00 9/-Daily-Kos-Elections-presidential-results-by-congressional-district-for-
the-2012-2008-elections [https://perma.cc/3AAW-6T2L].
110. Texas: Romney vs. Obama, REAL CLEAR POL., http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/
2012/president/tx/texas romneyvs obama-1 945.html [https://perma.cc/CK3N-3XWP] (last visited
Nov. 8, 2016).
111. 2012 Texas Presidential Results, POLITICO (Nov. 19, 2012, 2:48 PM), http://www.
politico.com/2012-election/results/president/texas/ [https://perma.cc/SJL9-37K4].
112. Id.
113. 2012 Ohio PresidentialResults, POLITICO (Nov. 19,2012,2:48 PM), http://www.politico.
com/2012-election/results/president/ohio/ [https://perma.cc/E88C-Q89J].
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sixty-eight percent of the vote in Cuyahoga County (Cleveland) and sixty percent
of the vote in Franklin County (Columbus), though Romney carried a number of
far smaller, rural counties by even more impressive margins.1
1 4 These differences
within states also help to explain the particular reality of the modem House of
Representatives and the importance, for example, of the call by Fair Vote for
repealing the congressional statute, dating back to 1842, that mandates single-
member districts and replacing it with one that requires relatively large states
(those with, say, more than nine representatives) to elect them in multi-member
districts using proportional representation)."' Among other things, this brings
home the degree to which our very definition of "majority rule" (assuming we
think that such rule is a good thing) is created in part by formal institutions and
the incentives they generate with regard, for example, to the creation and
maintenance of our particular two-party system.
But what this also suggests, among other things, is the tension within
American political and constitutional thought between adhering to the wishes of
majorities-even if those wishes are, as Justice Holmes put it in his Lochner
dissent, "tyrannical""'-and instead being disciplined by the demands -if
overarching constitutional norms or what Publius repeatedly invoked in The
Federalist as "the public good""' (or Michael Sandel, a leading contemporary
proponent of "civic republican" politics, describes as "the common good"' ).
Yet, as many people, including Dahl, have pointed out, Publius is Janus-faced,
for he also emphasized the ubiquitous elements of self-seeking and raw ambition
as constituting our politics, and he ultimately relied more on "ambition
counteracting ambition" than on the homilies contained in "parchment barriers,"
including the Bill of Rights, to discipline political leaders.'
We are, even as we are engaging in this exchange, observing the playing out
of these different versions of politics in the chaos enveloping the House of
Representatives and sparked by Boehner's resignation. 120 Publius was desperately
trying to prevent the creation of a party system, a system that, by definition,
means members of a given party must on occasion subordinate their own notions
of the public interest to the interests of their party.'
2 ' He failed completely and
unequivocally, with mixed consequences. There are many good reasons to have
political parties; furthermore, no serious person believes in the possibility of truly
114. Id.
115. Tory Mast, Seeking Fair Representation Before Full Representation, FAIR VOTE,
http://archive.fairvote.org/?page=526 [https://perma.cc/7JB2-7XEC] (last visited Nov. 11, 2016).
116. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
117. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
118. See Natan Doran, Michael Sandel and the Politics ofthe Common Good, FABIAN Soc'Y
(Sept. 21,2012), http://www.fabians.org.uk/michael-sandel-and-the-politics-of-the-common-good/
[https://perma.cc/3VA7-TK8B].
119. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 51 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
120. See Manu Raju & Deirdre Walsh, Why John Boehner Quit, CNN (Oct. 7,2015,5:00 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/25/politics/why-john-boehner-quit/ [https://perma.cc/HW9W-TYRD].
121. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
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non-partisan politics. Perhaps this is not true for the partisans of particular
monarchs or dictators who argue that they have remarkable capacities for
discerning the needs of their people.12 2 Benevolent despotism is still alive and
well as a theory, even if there are few advocates.2 3 But we must recognize that
there is no such thing as a free lunch, and partisan politics certainly brings defects
to government, sometimes very serious ones. These defects must be tamed by
some notion of subordination to a general good, even at the cost of party
advantage in the next election.
There is literally no reason to default on our debt or for the government to
shut down in December (or anytime else). If we were a parliamentary government
or even a system that recognized the existence of multiple parties within the
House of Representatives, the Speaker's resignation would signal that there was
a reorganization of the ruling coalition.'24 It was surely not unthinkable, even if
improbable, that John Boehner could have retained his Speakership until January
3, 2017 simply by entering into a coalition with Nancy Pelosi and House
Democrats, together with thirty Republicans who announce themselves to be
members of the National Patriotic Party, a group that recognizes the United States
simply cannot afford to pay the price demanded by the Freedom Caucus and its
allies.125 One might expect these hypothetical thirty members to be
disproportionately drawn from the ranks of those who have already announced
their intention not to run for re-election in 2016. Such a coalition would require
significant compromise by both Pelosi and the Democrat majority, on the one
hand, and the Republican colluders, on the other. But, as with the terms of any
future end to the conflict in the Middle East between Jewish Israelis and
Palestinians, the basic outline of a deal is already quite well known.'2 6 The
question is whether there are leaders willing to stake their futures (and perhaps
literal lives) on agreeing to the terms.
M. THE "HARD-WIRED CONSTITUTION" (OR THE
CONSTITUTION OF SETTLEMENT)
You continue to be far more optimistic than I am that the United States can
escape from its winter, spring, summer, and fall of its discontents by ingenious
(or ingenuous) "workarounds" of the more dismal features of the system
122. But see NATASHA M. EZROW & ERICA FRANTZ, DICTATORS AND DICTATORSHIPS:
UNDERSTANDING AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES AND THEIR LEADERS 12-13 (2011).
123. Id. at 8-9.
124. See John D. Huber, The Vote ofConfidence in Parliamentary Democracies, 90 AM. POL.
Sci. REV. 269, 269-70 (1996).
125. See Elena Schneider, The GOP Establishment Strikes Back, POLITICO (Oct. 5, 2016, 3:00
PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/08/gop-establishment-strikes-back-house-freedom-
caucus-226997 [https://perma.cc/XJ7K-ZENK].
126. See generally David C. Unger, The Inevitable Two-State Solution, 25 WORLD POL'Y J.
59, 59-60 (2008) (discussing the seemingly inevitable compromise to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict).
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bequeathed us in Philadelphia and left quite impervious to change because of the
truly dreadful Article V that structures constitutional amendment itself. You refer
to Steve Griffin's excellent new book,1 27 and one of Steve's suggestions is that
we would be far better off as a political (and constitutional) order if the national
government enjoyed the same opportunity that the citizenry of many American
states (and foreign countries) do to engage in at least some measure of direct
democracy through the initiative and referendum.
128
I will not rehearse all of my arguments as to why constitutional reform might
be both necessary and proper. As the dedicatee of Framed, you are well aware of
all of my arguments, and readers can obviously track them down with ease. 129
What I do wish to assert, in ending my second missive in this exchange, is that
the very worst consequence of Article V is that it has infantilized our politics by
making it impossible, as a practical matter, to have serious discussions about
constitutional reform.13 0 Frankly, only zealots would devote their scarce time,
money, and energy to proposals necessitating constitutional change. The
"amendment game" is simply stacked too much in favor of the status quo.'
Elizabeth Warren speaks of the game being "rigged" with regard to banks land
certain business corporations;13 2 this is even truer with regard to the Constitution
itself. If one is faced with rigged games, the most rational response, assuming that
revolutionary overthrow is impossible, is simply to do something else and to tell
oneself that the game is not really all that important anyhow.
I do not think that waiting until January to inaugurate a new President is the
most serious weakness in the Constitution; only a true zealot could possibly think
that. But I do think that you underestimate the potential costs of the hiatus that
has regularly been inflicted on the country where an insurgent candidate either
defeats the incumbent (Roosevelt in 1932,133 Reagan in 19801') or decisively
defeats the coalition presided over by the incumbent, even if he is not formally
127. See generally GRIFFIN, supra note 40.
128. Id. at 75.
129. See LEvINSON, supra note 82.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Zach Carter, Elizabeth Warren: American Justice is 'Rigged' in Favor of the Rich,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 6, 2016, 12:00 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/elizabeth-
warren-american-justice-rigged-for-rich us_56b205a2e4b04f9b57d7e5fe [https://perma.cc/9G89-
4ESZ].
133. See Kenneth T. Walsh, The Most Consequential Elections in History: Franklin Delano
Roosevelt and the Election of 1932, U.S. NEws (Oct. 6,2016,4:00 PM), http://www.usnews.com/
news/articles/2008/09/1 0/the-most-consequential-elections-in-history-franklin-delano-roosevelt-
and-the-election-of-1932 [https://perma.cc/HW9W-TYRD].
134. See Kenneth T. Walsh, The Most ConsequentialElections i  History: RonaldReagan and





on the ballot (Lincoln in 1860,135 Clinton in 1992,136 Obama in 2008137). It is no
small matter for the United States to have an ineffective President in the tine
between the discredited incumbent and the legitimate insurgent. But even
something so banal as moving up Inauguration Day is undiscussed and thought
impossible. The reason may simply be that it would necessarily require
confronting the perverse Electoral College, opposed by every Gallup poll taken
since 1944,13' but still structuring our presidential elections and creating the
dreadful phenomenon of battleground states that distort our entire polity."' It is
true, as you point out, that the Electoral College could in effect be neutralized
through adoption of the Fair Vote proposal by which the ten largest states would
agree to allocate their votes to the winner of the popular vote.'40 It is worth noting
though that it would not at all affect the potential costs of the delayed
inauguration, even if one stilled any doubts about the wisdom of the Fair Vote
proposal itself (which does not, importantly, require that the "winner" in fact
demonstrate majority support as against simply coming in first past the post in the
national totals).'4 '
The real point is that I almost desperately want a national conversation about
the weaknesses-and strengths-of our basic constitutional system and the
degree to which the rigidities of the written Constitution, coupled with what
Ferejohn and Eskridge have termed "constitutionalized statutes,"'42 including, for
example, the requirement of single-member districts, require explicit textual
135. See Mallie Jane Kim, The Election That Led to Civil War, U.S. NEWS (Oct. 6, 2016,4:20
PM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2010/12/02/the-election-that-led-to-the-civil-war-
mallie-jane-kim [https://perma.cc/7UJ6-H5KM].
136. See Robin Toner, The 1992 Elections: President-The Overview; Clinton Captures
Presidency with Huge Electoral Margin; Wins a Democratic Congress, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2016,
6:00 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/11/04/us/1992-elections-president-overview-clinton-
captures-presidency-with-huge.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/RT8Y-ZTY3].
137. See Adam Nagourney, Obama Wins Election, N.Y. TIMEs (Oct. 7, 2016, 6:20 PM),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/05/us/politics/05campaign.html [https://perma.cc/NLV9-TL83].
138. Lydia Saad, Americans Call for Term Limits, End to Electoral College, GALLUP (Jan.
18, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/15 9881/americans-call-term-limits-end-electoral-
college.aspx [https://perma.cc/5FJV-69WP].
139. See Portrait of a Swing State, DAILY EMERALD (Oct. 7, 2:15 PM), http://www.
dailyemerald.com/2004/10/04/portrait-of-a-swing-state/ [https://perma.cc/CEZ3-G8RY].
Obviously, we also learned in 2016 that the electoral vote could lead to a candidate who received
only 46% of the popular vote, and 2.5 million fewer actual votes than his opponent, could
nonetheless become President.
140. See The Electoral College, FAIR VOTE (Oct. 7, 2016), http://www.fairvote.org/the
electoral_college#howthe electoral college works today [https://perma.cc/A5CP-L9FJ].
141. See Gary Greg, Electoral College Keeps Elections Fair, POLITICO (Oct. 7, 2016 3:00
PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2012/12/keep-electoral-college-for-fair-presidential-votes-
084651 [https://perma.cc/6VAA-2VS2].
142. See WilliamN. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1216
(2001).
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amendment and not simply clever workarounds. We would be having such
conversations-and possibly even conventions-if, like fourteen states in the
Union,143 the Constitution's text mandated that the electorate be given the
opportunity, at stated intervals (usually ten or twenty years) to vote on whether
or not to have a new constitutional convention.1' Perhaps it is a bit like an
assisted suicide statute; one may very well never use the life-ending drug supplied
by a physician, but it is a great comfort to know the possibility is there and that,
therefore, one is more genuinely in control of one's life, including the inevitable
leave-taking. Whatever the promise of the Constitution's Preamble about the
importance of "We the People,"'4 5 the reality is something else, and I, for one,
would feel much better if the citizenry were not forced to continue living under
a greatly defective Constitution because our doctors, in 1787, deprived us of an
effective way of reasserting our own collective autonomy.
I will stop for now, secure in the belief that you will offer thoughtful




You freely acknowledge that your view that our constitutional system is
dysfunctional is shaped by your political preferences. We might compare your
approach to constitutional dysfunction to that of the Progressives in the early
twentieth century. Their demand for constitutional reform was propelled by a
substantive agenda, combined with the sense that the old Constitution blocked
desirable change. The Progressive political scientist Henry Jones Ford famously
spoke of the Progressive vision of the presidency as "the work of the people,
breaking through the constitutional form."'46 In much the same way, you want to
break through our present-day constitutional forms to reenergize government and
achieve reforms that, in your opinion, the country desperately needs.
Of course, as soon as you link your calls for constitutional reform to a
particular (progressive) substantive agenda, you will likely lose support from
people who do not agree with your politics. And that may make it very hard to
143. See ALA. CONST. art. XIII, § 3; see also Mandatory Vote About Whether a Statewide
Constitutional Convention ShallBe Held, BALLOTPEDIA, https:/iballotpedia.org/Mandatoryvote
about whether a statewide constitutionalconvention shall beheld [https://perma.cc/6LKG-
V4M7] (last visited Nov. 11, 2016).
144. Id.
145. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
146. RiCHARD J. ELLIS, THE DEVELOPMENTOFTHEAMERICAN PRESIDENCY 14(2012) (quoting
HENRY JONES FORD, THE RISE AND GROWTH OF AMERICAN POLITICS 292-93 (1898)).
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obtain supermajority support in Congress and in the states.
As you have pointed out, Tea Party conservatives are also quite interested in
constitutional reform.'47 They simply seek different reforms than you do, and with
different ends than yours. Nevertheless, what you and the Tea Party share is the
belief that constitutional reform is not inconsistent with the best parts of the
American political tradition.'48 Quite the contrary, as Publius argues in the
opening essay of The Federalist, making our system of government a matter of
"reflection and choice" is and should be the most characteristically American
enterprise.'4 9 But where many Tea Party acolytes regard much of twentieth
century constitutional development as a mistake and seek a kind of constitutional
restoration, you hope to move the Constitution in an even more Progressive (in
both senses of the word) direction.
This helps explain your view that a unified federal government under the
leadership of the current Republican Party might be dysfunctional under your
definition of that term. Offering a comparison to the German blitzkrieg at the
beginning of World War II, you argue that political efficiency in the service of
a disastrous political agenda is not an efficiency worth having. Yet this concern
is the classic justification for the very features of our constitutional system that
you would like to reform. The American Constitution has multiple veto points
and checks and balances precisely to prevent the kind of calamity that you fear
would occur if your political adversaries were able to work their will without
restraint. So it is a bit odd for you to offer these concerns in your explanation of
why our constitutional system is dysfunctional. Put another way, I do not think
one can simultaneously argue that the Constitution is dysfunctional if it prevents
progressives from pursuing agendas that they believe are in the public interest,
but that it is also dysfunctional if it fails to prevent conservatives from pursuing
their agendas.
But perhaps there is a better way to make your point. You suggest that if a
firebrand like Ted Cruz were elected in 2016, and if the Republicans retained
majorities in both Houses of Congress, liberal states in the Pacific West might
consider secession. A central function of a constitution is, as I like to say, to
"make politics possible."' A well-functioning constitution establishes a political
order that gives people incentives to resolve their disputes through politics and
protest rather than through violence and civil war."' So, you might argue, if
significant parts of the country have lost faith that they will eventually be able to
get a fair shake through ordinary politics, there is something deeply wrong with
the Constitution. And if a constitution can not keep a political union together, it
147. Seegenerally ChristopherW. Schmidt, The Tea Party and the Constitution, 39 HASTTNGS
CONST. L.Q. 193 (2011) (discussing the Tea Party as a constitutional movement).
148. Id.
149. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 87 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
150. Jack M. Balkin, The Framework Model and Constitutional Interpretation, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 241, 242-43 (David Dyzenhaus &
Malcom Thorbum eds., 2016).
151. Id. at 243.
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is to that extent a failure. Thus, the argument might go, the problem is not that
you find the policies of a unified Republican government objectionable. Rather,
the problem is that such a government will lead to dissolution of the Union,
which is evidence of constitutional failure. In the same way, you might point out,
even if Abraham Lincoln's election in 1860 was a very good thing for the United
States, the fact that various states seceded in 1861 is proof that the 1787
Constitution had failed at its most central function.
Fair enough. But I think that there is very little evidence that any part of the
country would attempt to secede-much less actually achieve independence-if
the Republican Party gained the presidency and both Houses of Congress, as it
did only a decade ago during George W. Bush's Administration. One of the most
interesting features of our present polarized politics is how remarkably little
widespread political unrest there has been to date. (I include protests against
police misconduct by groups like Black Lives Matter.) Moreover, even if the
Pacific states wanted to leave, it is simply not feasible for a superpower like the
United States to permit a potentially hostile country to form on its western border,
especially if that country would retain a powerful military and any degree of
nuclear power. I think it is safe to say that, at least at this point in its history, the
United States will not consent to the exit of any state from the Union. Of course,
this may change in the future, but it would be under very different
circumstances-when the United States was so debilitated that it was no longer
a major world power and could no longer enforce its will within its own borders.
For example, secession might occur if the United States had been successfully
invaded by another power, or if an economic crisis left the central government
unable to provide basic services to or defend parts of the country. That is not the
situation today. For this reason, I do not think you have made the case that a
unified government led by Republicans is dysfunctional because it may lead to
secession. It may lead to very unwise policies, but those are not the same thing
as dysfunction.
One should not, however, let disputes about the concept of dysfunction get
in the way of your larger point. You argue that "the very worst consequence of
Article V is that it has infantilized our politics by making it impossible, as a
practical matter, even to have serious discussions, at least outside the seminar
room, about constitutional reform."lS2 I agree with you that it is important for
Americans to have serious discussions about constitutional reform, especially in
today's circumstances. I disagree with you that Article V stands in the way of
serious discussion.
Constitutional reform involves the constituent power of the people-the
power of "We the People"-to establish a constitution and alter or amend it. But
we should not assume that the constituent power of the people is reserved only
to "great and extraordinary occasions," as The FederalistNo. 49 puts it.153 Rather,
much contemporary constitutional theory, including theories that you have
championed, argues that the constituent power of the people can be and often is
152. See supra Levinson's letter dated October 12, 2015.
153. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 313 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
3072016]1
INDIANA LAW REVIEW
exercised outside of Article V.154 Both Bruce Ackerman's work on constitutional
moments and my work on constitutional construction are premised on the idea
that "We the People" engage in constitutional change outside of Article V.
Ackerman argues that Americans have worked around the state-centered rules of
Article V amendment and developed national models for constitutional
amendment.'15 I have argued that through state-building constructions by the
political branches and judicial constructions by the courts, Americans have
repeatedly changed the constitution-in-practice.'
I believe that you should integrate your earlier work on constitutional
amendment with your present work on constitutional design. The two fit together
very well.
How is it possible to have constitutional reform without Article V
amendment? As I pointed out in my initial response, it is crucial to distinguish
between the hard-wired Constitution and the constitutional order. Although the
hard-wired Constitution requires Article V amendment, the constitutional order
can be altered through many different methods.'" These include ordinary
legislation, changes in the internal rules of the Senate and House, constitutional
workarounds, and state compacts-such as the reform of the Electoral College I
mentioned previously. They also include new judicial appointments and new
judicial doctrines that might limit or overrule previous decisions and uphold new
campaign finance and voting reforms. If America does change its campaign
finance and electoral systems, I expect that most of the reforms, if not all of them,
will occur outside of Article V amendment.
I do not pretend that every reform to our constitutional system can be
achieved outside of Article V. We cannot, for example, move Inauguration Day
to the second week of November (although, of course, we could create a set of
political conventions that ameliorated the problem if the outgoing and incoming
administrations cooperated). But this does not strike me as a major source of our
current difficulties. Rather, as discussed in my first essay, our most pressing
problems concern our system of representation. We can address most of these
through the methods of constitutional construction I have listed above. And many
other problems that we currently associate with political dysfunction will recede
as we transition to a new constitutional regime.
My central disagreement with your approach is that you too easily run
together constitutional reform with Article V amendment or with a new
constitutional convention. Doing so exacerbates the very problem of
"infantilization" that you complain about. It leads people to believe that they can
only change their political institutions through Article V or through a new
convention, which, in turn, leads to despair and resignation. Yet constitutional
154. Sanford Levinson, Jack Balkin as the Picasso of Constitutional Theorists, 2012 U. ILL.
L. REv. 711, 716.
155. See generally 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) [hereinafter
ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE].
156. See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 10, 21-22, 70-71, 305-12 (2011).
157. Balkin,supra note 16, at 1162-63.
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reform is not the same thing as Article V amendment. Amendment is only one
path. If you actually want constitutional reform to move outside of the seminar
room and into political discussion, you should accept and emphasize this way of
framing the issue.
Although the nation seems mired in gridlock, political conditions are not
permanent. They change. This fact should give us hope that it is worth making the
effort. Even if progress is slow at first, the course of American history
demonstrates, over and over again, that political persistence can pay off. And
when change comes, it is often rapid, although the previous struggles and
preparations that make change possible often take many years. The reforms of the
Progressive Era were many decades in the making; so too were the changes of the
New Deal and the Civil Rights Revolution. Some of the political reforms our
country needs will come through Article V amendment; but many, perhaps most,
will not. That is the central lesson that people should draw from our history.
There is no reason why Americans should despair that their generation cannot
also be one of great achievement. You have often pointed out, correctly, that
blind reverence for the Constitution is a great failing. ' But faith in the possibility
of progress is not blind reverence; and faith in the adaptability of our




The first thing the reader will notice, of course, is that our first two letters
were written within what Aristotle might have called a relative unity of time,'
whereas this new exchange begins more than a full eight months later than your
November 1st response to my prior letter. Even more important than the lag per
se is the fact that we are now writing after the conclusions of the Republican and
Democratic national conventions and their respective nominations of Donald
Trump and Hillary Clinton for the presidency.
6 o
To put it mildly, much has happened since what now appear the almost
halcyon days of November, when we were in Indianapolis. As John Lennon is to
158. LEVINSON, supra note 54, at 9 (arguing that people should not have "blind devotion" for
the Constitution if it is dysfunctional and undemocratic).
159. See generally Richard T. Urban, All or Nothing atAll: Another Look at the Unity ofTime
in Aristotle, 61 CLASSICAL J. 262, 262 (1966) (attributing the concept of the unity of time to
Aristotle).
160. Who is Running for President?, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2016/us/elections/2016-presidential-candidates.html [https://perma.cc/Y6NN-RXJQ].
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have said, "Life is what happens while you're busy making other plans;"'6' one
can say with confidence that many of those who made plans as to what the 2016
election would be like, particularly at the presidential level, have found them
nearly irrelevant. In Indianapolis, we were talking about whether Paul Ryan could
in fact tame the recalcitrant Freedom Caucus within the House.162 Should Donald
Trump become President, that might literally be the least of Ryan's worries!
By the time these letters are actually published, readers will know how this
political drama has ended. Rather than engage in prognostications that will be of
little interest several months from now, let me offer some wider-ranging
comments on the constitutional significance of the election battle, especially in
terms of our overarching debate about the contribution of the Constitution to our
political discontents.
I note that I am deeply disappointed (and more than a bit angry) at Bernie
Sanders, not for running against Hillary Clinton, whom in fact I supported, but,
rather, for posturing as a "political revolutionary" without once, even for a
millisecond, suggesting that any serious revolution would require engaging first
in what Publius called serious "reflection" about the adequacy of the Constitution
in the twenty-first century and then in a collective "choice" to change things, as
was done so notably in 1787.163 Sanders never bothered to inform his
impressionable followers that his promises, whatever their merit, had almost zero
chance of actual adoption because of the structures adopted in 1787. What he was
doing, in his own way, was imitating Donald Trump, by pretending in effect that
presidents could wave magic wands and make things happen. On occasion, as in
certain aspects of foreign and military policy, that might be true; with regard to
domestic affairs, it is remarkably untrue, as Hillary Clinton learned to her dismay
when living in the White House with her husband and attempting to reform the
American medical services industry.'64 She is often criticized for the relative
"prose" of her campaign, in contrast to the "poetry" that often characterizes her
opponents, whether Obama in 2008 or Sanders or even Trump in 2016.'s Mario
Cuomo famously declared that one campaigns in poetry, but must govern in
prose."' Perhaps she has learned that all "poetry" does is raise expectations that
161. JOHN LENNON, BEAUTIFUL BOY (DARLING Boy) (Geffen Records 1981).
162. See generally Scott Wong, SpeakerRyan Courts Conservatives, THE HIL (Jan. 26,2016,
6:00 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/house/266890-ryan-seeks-to-court-conservatives [https://
perma.cc/QE44-L8XB] (discussing Speaker Ryan's difficulties reigning in the Freedom Caucus).
163. See Bernie Sanders, The Political Revolution Continues, BERNIE 2016,
https://bemiesanders.com/political-revolution-continues/ [https://perma.cc/UVQ9-NRL5]; THE
FEDERALIST No. 1 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
164. See generally Matthew Carrigan, The Transformation ofGoingPublic: President Clinton,
the First Lady, and Health Care Reform, 17 POL. COMM. 149 (2000) (discussing the failure of the
Clinton health care plan and Hillary Clinton's role in promoting the plan).
165. See Doyle McManus, Hillary Clinton's Problem: Too Much Prose, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 7,
2016,5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/a-oe-0207-mcmanus-clinton-poetry-prose-
20160207-column.html [https://perma.cc/QRN5-SCPZ].
166. See Elizabeth Kolbert, Postscript: Mario Cuomo (1932-2015),NEw YORKER: NEWS DESK
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cannot possibly be met, which leads, almost inexorably, to further disillusionment
and alienation.
And here is where I continue to ride my hobbyhorse of wanting us to pay
attention to the Constitution itself and at least to think of serious constitutional
reform. Our overemphasis on the candidates and the promises they make has led
us to the over-personalization of politics, the belief that everything will be all
right if only we get the right leader or, concomitantly, that what is going wrong
can be blamed on the deficiencies of the leaders we have. 16 We end up adopting
a version of the "great man" (or "woman") theory of history, reinforced by the
general emphasis, especially of history written for a general audience, on
presidents as heroes or villains.
I do not want to deny the importance of individuals. I do think it was
important that we had presidents with the political skills and moral imagination
of Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt. But I think that we ignore the
importance of underlying structures--or, for that matter, of the political cultures
and social movements that placed Lincoln and Roosevelt in office and gave them
support-at our peril. I personally view Donald Trump as a narcissistic sociopath
who simply must be beaten. It would be an utter calamity for the United States
and for the entire world if he became our President. I can imagine all sorts of
scenarios that would follow, including the rise of serious secessionist movements
in New England or what I call "Pacifica" or a de facto military coup triggered by
the justified unwillingness to obey either illegal or disastrously unwise orders
from the Commander-in-Chief. It is also easy enough to imagine mass
demonstrations or riots, particularly on Inauguration Day, or the unwillingness
of the Senate to confirm most of his nominees. I certainly would not want to have
Chris Christie or Rudolph Guiliani'" as Attorney General, not to mention anyone
from Trump's list of potential Supreme Court nominees.' Perhaps the happiest
result, from the perspective of Indiana Republicans, would be the quick
impeachment of Trump and his replacement by Vice President Pence,'" though
(Jan. 1,2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/postscrip-mario-cuomo [https://perma.
cc/26LR-Y39G].
167. See generally Sergio Fabbrini, Personalization as Americanization?: The Rise and Fall
ofLeader-Dominant Government in Western Europe in the Eighties, 32 AM. STUD. INT'L 51, 56
(1994) (discussing America's change to leader-dominated government and the personalization of
executive action through the 1970s and 80s).
168. Or, I would now add, Alabama Sen. Jeffrey Beauregard Sessions.
169. Donald J. Trump Releases List of Potential United States Supreme Court Justices,
DONALDJTRUMP.COM (May 18, 2016), https://www.donaldjtrump.com/press-releases/donald-j.-
trump-releases-list-of-names-of-potential-united-states-supreme-c [https://perma.cc/W4UH-3DWG]
(Initial list available at the time of this letter was written, but has now been expanded to twenty-one
persons. Donald J Trump Finalizes List of Potential Supreme Court Justice Picks,
DONALDJTRUMP.COM (Sept. 23, 2016), https://www.donaldjtrump.com/press-releases/donald-j.-
trump-adds-to-list-of-potential-supreme-court-justice-picks [https://perma.cc/R676-ZLYK]).
170. See generally EricaKeppler, Republicans Should Callfor Donald Trump's Impeachment,
HUFFINGTON POST (July 18, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/erica-keppler/impeachment-
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that, too, would obviously roil the public at large given that there is no reason
whatsoever to believe that "We the People" would choose Pence as President in
any normal election."'
But enough of speculation about the future. What I want to conclude with are
some musings answering the following question: Should we really be so
completely shocked at the rise of a narcissistic sociopath like Donald Trump as
a potential President (rather than, say, candidate for the House or Senate)? I think
that Max Weber, the great German political sociologist, has much to teach us in
a 1918 essay that he wrote in the aftermath of World War I and the transformation
of Germany from an authoritarian monarchy to a presumably more democratic
political system.'72 Weber suggested that all systems of "direct election by the
people of the bearer of supreme power" have within them an impulse (perhaps
today, we should use the metaphor of a "gene") toward Caesarism.'73 It is, of
course, a notable truth about the 1787 Constitution that it explicitly rejected
proposals for direct election in favor of what I strongly believe to be the inanity
of the Electoral College. 17 But the original theory, if not the played-out reality,
of the Electoral College was not so inane. One might imagine the electors as the
original superdelegates,17 chosen by the legislature or by the electorate to
exercise independent judgment as to who would best serve the interests of the
Union."'7 That vision of the Electoral College, whatever one thinks of it, has long
since collapsed. Contemporary electors serve no useful purpose as genuine filters
between popular sentiment and presidential selection. They are expected simply
to mirror the preferences of the majorities in their states (save in Maine and
Nebraska, which do not follow the winner-take-all principle, but still give electors
likely-for-a-_b_11023350.html [https://perma.cc/B28J-VGGM] (suggesting republicans should
allow Donald Trump to be elected, then impeach him within months, leaving Pence as President).
171. See Clare Foran, The GOP Shouldn't Wish for a Mike Pence 2020 Run, ATLANTIC (Oct.
5, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/10/mike-pence-debate-2020-
presidential-run/503039/ [https://perma.cc/76BZ-CSLJ] (arguing the policies of Pence are against
the direction the party had previously decided to take and that he is currently looking good only
when compared with Trump).
172. See generally MAX WEBER, A Biographical View, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN
SOCIOLOGY 3, 17-22 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills trans., 1946), https://archive.org/stream/
frommaxweberessa00webe#page/n9/mode/2up [https://perma.cclW2JB-3MF4] (discussing Weber's
changing political identity during 1918).
173. Max Weber, Parliament and Government in Germany Under a New Political Order, in
WEBER: POLITICAL WRITINGS 130, 221 (Peter Lassman & Ronald Spiers eds., 1994).
174. Norman R. Williams, Why the NPVC is Unconstitutional, 2012 BYUL. Rev. 1523, 1541
(2012).
175. See Jeff Greenfield, Why We Need Those 'Anti-Democratic' Superdelagates, POLITICO
MAG.(May28,2016), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/05/why-we-need-those-anti-
democratic-superdelegates-213921 [https://perma.cc/5DYC-2KMM] (arguing superdelagates
protect people and parties from bad candidates through their autonomy).
176. Williams, supra note 174, at 1559.
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no real judgment'77). Indeed, we refer to electors who do think for themselves as
rogues, though, fortunately, none has been truly consequential in choosing a
President. That being said, if Donald Trump does win the election, it is entirely
possible that some people will entreat the electors to exercise independent
judgment and prevent him from taking office."'
The great alternative to direct election, of course, is parliamentary
designation, in which the "bearer of supreme power" is always vulnerable to the
parliamentary majority."' Political parties can claim "mandates," but in a
properly functioning parliamentary system, prime ministers cannot claim personal
mandates that override the wishes of their parties or coalitions that placed them
in power."0 But, of course, the United States, unlike most developed countries in
the world today, has resolutely rejected parliamentarianism in favor of a
byzantine system of separation of powers that explains the phenomenon of the
2016 election season. At the very least, this is a subject worth discussing in the
constitutional convention that I continue to hope we have. Indeed, it would be a
worthy topic should the voters of New York exercise their constitutionally-
granted powers (under the New York State Constitution) to vote in 2017 to call
a new convention to discuss amending that constitution.'' States have totally
failed to serve as "little laboratories of experimentation" with regard to presenting
alternatives to separation of powers, which is a real shame.1
8 2
In any event, the phenomenon of Donald Trump may be an illustration,
dreadful but accurate, of the Weberian analysis. The sociopathic, narcissistic
Trump is running a classically "Caesarist" campaign, relying on large rallies and
whipping up crowds by the use of bombastic claims that ultimately rely on the
177. Michael G. Neubauer & Joel Zeitlin, Outcomes ofPresidential Elections and the House
Size, 36 PS: POL. ScI. & POL. 721, 722 (2003).
178. Indeed, following the election, I became one of those people! See Sanford Levinson,
Jeremi Suri, & Jeffrey Tulis, The Hail Mary Pass that Could Deny Donald Trump the Presidency:
It's Up to You, Electors,NYDAILYNEWS (Nov. 21,2016 1:35 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/
opin ion/tuis8-1evin son5-suri-hai-mary-defeat-donald-trump-article- 1.2882315
[https://perma.cc/GE7N-TDUG] (calling on patriotic electors to unite in providing the House of
Representatives with an alternative Republican that might be named to the presidency under the
procedures set out by the Twelfth Amendment).
179. See Richard Albert, The Fusion ofPresidentialism and Parliamentarianism, 57 AM. J.
COMP. L. 531, 550-52 (2009) (discussing the implications of a vote of no confidence in
parliamentary systems).
180. See generally Elijah Ben-Zion Kaminsky, On the Comparison of Presidential and
Parliamentary Governments, 27 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 221, 221 (1997) (explicating the general
argument that in a parliamentary system is more likely to lead to agreement about policies).
181. N.Y. CONST. art. XIX, § 2.
182. The idea of having states act as laboratories for the federal government was coined in a
famous dissent by Justice Brandeis: "[A] state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country." New State Ice
Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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premise that he alone can "make America great again."83 It was George W. Bush
who emphasized that he alone was "the decider."'8 4 Trump is building on that
image of the presidency.
In all fairness, though, one should not assume that Weber's analysis kicks in
only this year, without any such inklings prior to this dreadful political year (or
to the Bush-Cheney regime). My colleague Jeff Tulis has written a classic book,
The RhetoricalPresidency,'5 that illuminates the differences between what might
be called "classical" and "contemporary" conceptions of the presidency.'18 Tulis
emphasizes the break, which he identifies particularly with Woodrow Wilson,
with a relatively modest conception of the presidency.'" Consider for starters that
prior to the twentieth century, candidates really did not engage in personal
campaigns; that was viewed as beneath the dignity of the office.' 8 Moreover,
presidents sent written messages to Congress on the state of the Union rather than
command a nation-wide audience to watch them deliver an address in person
before a (usually) respectful Congress.' President Wilson, who (justifiably)
disdained much about the U.S. Constitution, envisioned himself as a prime
minister charged with truly "leading" the nation.'" One might, of course, also pay
attention to his predecessor Teddy Roosevelt and his conception of the presidency
as offering a "bully pulpit.""' Both, perhaps, traced their conceptions of
presidential authority back to Andrew Jackson's notion that he was a "tribune of
the people," by virtue of what had become de-facto direct election.'92 Perhaps not
coincidentally,. Jackson's opponents considered him an utter demagogue.'9 3 His
183. See generally Tom Engelhardt, What Trump Really Means When He Says He'll Make
America GreatAgain, THE NATION(Apr. 26,2016),https://www.thenation.com/article/what-trump-
really-means-when-he-says-hell-make-america-great-again/ [https://perma.cc/NXL4-RFYT]
(reinforcing "make America great again" as the backbone of Trump's campaign and that Trump
has said he alone can accomplish this).
184. Ed Henry & Barbara Starr, Bush: "I'm the Decider" on Rumsfeld, CNN (Apr. 18, 2006,
10:30PM), http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/04/18/rumsfeld/ [https://perma.cc/FLT3-WC5J].
185. JEFFREY K. TULIS, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY (1987).
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187. David A. Crocket, George W Bush and the Unrhetorical Rhetorical Presidency, 6
RHETORIC AND PUB. AFF. 465, 468-69 (2003).
188. But see Johnny Goodtimes, A Brief History of Campaign Mudslinging, from 1796 to
Today, PHILADELPHIA (Oct. 24, 2012, 9:07 AM), http://www.phillymag.com/news/2012/10/24/
presidential-campaign-dirty-politics-mudslinging/ [https://perma.cc/LB57-B2PQ] (giving anecdotal
examples of early personal attacks on presidential candidates, like Thomas Jefferson).
189. RYAN LEE TETEN, EVOLUTIONARY RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY: TRACING THE CHANGES
IN PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS AND POWER 16 (2011).
190. See Crocket, supra note 187, at 467.
191. See David Greenberg, Beyond the Bully Pulpit, 35 WILSON Q. 22, 25 (1976).
192. Donald 0. Dewey, Madison 's Response to Jackson's Foes, 20 TENN. HIST. Q. 167, 167
(1961).
193. Robert Whaples, Were Andrew Jackson's Policies "Goodfor the Economy"?, 18 INDEP.
REV. 545, 545 (2014).
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predecessor, John Quincy Adams, a Harvard overseer, refused to support
awarding Jackson an honorary degree, writing in his diary that the University was
placing its "highest literary honors upon a barbarian who could not write a
sentence of grammar and could hardly spell his own name."l94 American Indians
in particular might offer yet other reasons for considering Jackson a barbarian.
The point is that even by 1828 the Publian assurances et out in The Federalist,
that the President would always be a person of unusually sterling character and
civic virtue, lost their persuasiveness.'
Modem communications technology, something you are far more familiar
with than I, offers new possibilities to would-be demagogues. Although Calvin
Coolidge, perhaps surprisingly, was the first President to make use of radio,' it
was of course FDR, with his fireside chats, who perfected that medium.' And
then there came television, and now we have, especially for Trump, Twitter."'
One might argue that the great quantum jump toward a more Caesarist
conception of the presidency was the Kennedy election of 1960, when television
really became important.'" An attractive young senator with precious little
accomplishment o his name, but lots of"charisma,"-a Weberian word that first
made its entrance into common punditry-made it to the top of the electoral
greasy pole (with due help from his family fortune and the support of Chicago
Mayor Richard J. Daley).2" He and his wife charmed the public, and his
assassination made many feel that we had lost a truly incomparable
leader.20' And, of course, there was the psycho-drama of the Cuban Missile Crisis,
where Kennedy simply ignored existing political structures in favor of the
Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm) and,
ultimately, made the decision on his own to risk World War In by ordering a
194. EDWARD PESSEN, JACKSONIAN AMERICA: SOCIETY, PERSONALITY, AND POLITICS 180
(1985).
195. See THE FEDERALISTNo. 68, at 414 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
196. The Learning Network, Calvin Coolidge Delivers First Presidential Address on Radio,




198. See Michael Barbaro, How Donald Trump Uses Twitter (Hint: Impulsively), N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 5,2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/06/us/politics/how-donald-trump-uses-twitter.htfl
[https://perma.cc/V76T-UPVS].
199. Don Gonyea, How JFK Fathered the Modern Presidential Campaign, NAT' LPU B. RADIO
(Nov. 16, 2013, 7:30 AM), http://www.npr.org/2013/l1/16/245550528/jfk-wrote-the-book-on-
modern-presidential-campaigns [https://perma.cc/VH9K-GCZD].
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2010, 10:30 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/
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"quarantine" of Cuba that fortunately worked.202
Skip forward to Ronald Reagan, who honed all of his professional skills to
likewise charm the public (and, in fairness, he had demonstrated a competence
for politics in governing California for eight years,203 even if one was, like me,
appalled by his political views). In any event, we seem more and more to look to
presidents for "visionary leadership," not to mention largely fictive twenty-point
programs that are presented as the cures for whatever ail us. As an avid supporter
of Barack Obama in 2008 (against Hillary Clinton, of course), I think it is
appropriate to note the Caesarist aspects of his own remarkable campaign,
including the reliance on mass rallies and vague promises.204 Obama never once
suggested that only he could guide us out of the political wilderness, but it was
certainly the case that many of his supporters viewed him, in Maureen Dowd's
snarky language, as "the One" whose unique abilities and "audacity" would lead
us out of the wilderness.205 Not surprisingly, he disappointed such hopes, but that
is another matter.
Republicans, of course, believe that Obama is increasingly governing in a
Caesarist fashion. Obama has engaged in a variety of unilateral decisions, and
some Republican judges agree (including, presumably, the four conservative
Republicans who inhabit the current Supreme Court).206 I disagree with some of
the claims to unilateral military authority that Obama has made,207 even if they
rest on, shall we say, generous readings of congressional delegations of power to
the President. Perhaps his most dramatic exercise of unilateralism was his
exchange of prisoners with the Taliban in defiance of a clear congressional
directive that Congress be given thirty-days notice.208 One can readily agree with
202. The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962, OFF. HISTOlUAN, https://history.state.gov/
milestones/1 961-1968/cuban-missile-crisis [https://perma.cc/BUT7-3NRA] (last visited Nov. 12,
2016).
203. Ronald Reagan, HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.com/topics/us-presidents/ronald-
reagan [https://perma.cc/ZW2E-EJVG] (last visited Nov. 12, 2016).
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THEBLAZE (Mar. 14,2016,4:32PM),http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2016/03/14/how-do-trump-
crowd-sizes-really-compare-to-obamas-2008-crowds/ [https://perma.cc/94XB-8PE4].
205. Maureen Dowd, A Storyteller Loses the Story Line, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/02/opinion/02dowd.html [https://perma.cc/M9KS-EYWL].
206. See, e.g., Richard Wolf et al., Federal Judge Strikes Down Obamacare Payments, USA
TODAY (May 12, 2016, 6:02 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2016/05/12/
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TIMEs (June 23,2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2 016/06/24 /us/supreme-court-immigration-obama-
dapa.html [https://perma.cc/Y7LC-FJH2].
207. See Conor Friedersdorf, The Perils ofObama's Latest Undeclared War, ATLANTIC (Nov.
2, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/11/the-perils-of-president-obamas-
latest-undeclared-war/413566/ [https://perma.cc/5KNC-B78P].
208. Jeremy Diamond, HouseReportAccuses Obama ofViolatingLaw in BergdahlExchange,
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his motives and still be a bit perturbed by his extravagant reading of his powers
as Commander-in-Chief.209
It is certainly the case that both Democratic and Republican presidents have
been extending their powers in reaction to the breakdown of Congress as a truly
21functioning institution.210 Caesarists' power, after all, is not necessary seized. It
is often delegated by supine legislatures either caught up in party loyalty or a
simple reluctance to engage in the hard tasks of governance (and the necessity of
spending an inordinate amount of time raising money in a thoroughly corrupting
system of campaign finance).2 11
What Trump wants is exactly what Weber predicted, an "acclamation" by
scared masses who basically license him to do, quite literally, whatever he wishes
to meet the problems he identifies.2 12 To believe, as do some of those
"supporting" him without "endorsing" him (think, e.g., of Mitch McConnell),213
that he is capable of being internally constrained by the notion of legal obligation
or duties is sheer fantasy. Sociopathic narcissists recognize no such internal
obligations. They are the epitome of Holmesian "bad men," who calculate
everything in terms of personal profit and loss.214
So we should at least consider the frightening possibility that Weber was
correct almost a century ago in suggesting that Trumpism may be a dangerous
virus located in the DNA of the American constitutional order.2 15 We have seen
the valorization of presidents as maximum leaders with grandiose visions, which
they have "mandates" to implement, whatever it takes.
216 No serious political
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2 016/01/donald-
trump-2016-authoritarian-213533 [https://perma.cc/VBM7-9UYZ].
213. Andrew Rudalevige, No, White House Lawyers Would Not Prevent a President Trump





214. David Luban, The BadMan and the Good Lawyer: A Centennial Essay on Holmes's "The
Path of the Law," 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1547, 1574 (1997).
215. See generally MAX WEBER, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN
SOCIOLOGY 77 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills trans., 1946).
216. Huma Khan, In First 100 Days, Obama Flips Bush Admin's Policies, ABC NEWS (Apr.
317
INDIANA LAW REVIEW
system should have to contemplate the possibility of being "governed" by a
narcissistic sociopath.
These are truly dark times, though for reasons very different from those
suggested by Donald Trump. My obsessive fear is that, when217 Hillary is elected,
we will collectively congratulate ourselves for dodging a potentially fatal bullet
and return to our blithe confidence. In Gerald Ford's reassuring words, "our long
national nightmare is over" because "[o]ur Constitution works."2 18 I wish it were
that easy. You are well aware of the important book published a few years ago by
Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian
Republic.219 It is notable, in my opinion, for its almost exuberant embrace of
much of the jurisprudential approach of Carl Schmitt and his analysis of
developments in Germany during the Weimar era, such as, the rise of the modern
administrative state. The central point-which is true as well of a forthcoming
book on the administrative state by Vermeule2 2 o-iS that, generally, the central
characteristic of the modern state is the amount of discretion it lodges in the
executive branch.22' And, to the extent one accepts some of the more extravagant
theories of the "unitary executive," it is the President who ultimately enjoys a
sufficient degree of discretionary authority. This is based either on readings of the
Constitution or on broad statutes passed by Congress delegating power to the
Executive, which justifies the assertion that the U.S. has its own form of
"constitutional dictatorship,"2" especially if we elect a person who lacks a
genuine internal compass. And, of course, the President gets to pick his own
lawyers, the most important of whom are in the White House or the Office of
Legal Counsel.223 George W. Bush found John Yoo and now-judge Jay Bybee.224
I have no doubt that a President Trump, empowered by the Constitution to
nominate judges (who would be confirmed by a morally-bankrupt Republican
Party who would prattle about their duty to follow the wishes of the public that
elected Trump, which is how they have justified their spinelessness in endorsing
29, 2009) (noting how supporters celebrate Obama's executive orders), http://abcnews.go.coml
Politics/Obamal 00days/story?id=704217 1&page--1 [https://perma.cc/JK95-NSYL].
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219. ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2011).
220. ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW'S ABNEGATION (forthcoming 2016).
221. See, e.g., Handbook of European Politics 195-96 (Knud Erik Jorgansen et al. eds., 2006)
(discussing how conceptualizations of European Union members are increasingly defined by
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Trump as their candidate), would find his share of ambitious lawyers, some
educated, no doubt, at Harvard or Yale (think of the egregious Kris Kobach, the
architect of the anti-immigrant laws that plague our country25 ), who would
happily construe the extant legal materials to allow Trump to do just about
whatever he wanted (remember, incidentally, the pardon power, the great
wildcard in the American constitutional system that allows a President to offer a
get-out-of-jail free card to whomever he or she wishes226). All of this is simply to
suggest that those who place their faith in the Madisonian system of checks and
balances to save us from the ravages of a sociopathic narcissist are deluding
themselves. This is true at the empirical level, even if one shares their belief in
Madisonianism. But James Madison has truly, and irrevocably, left the building.
This is a bit longer than my other letters, but, then, much has happened since





I do not believe that Donald Trump's rise changes the analysis of
constitutional dysfunction. To the contrary, it fits perfectly into the arguments I
have been making. Trump's rise was not caused by a defective Constitution, but
it is a response-however mistaken-to an increasingly undemocratic and
unrepublican political system. (Indeed, Trump's rhetoric plays on fears that the
system is rigged against ordinary people.) At the same time, your discussion of
the threats posed by Trump's candidacy highlights some of the tensions implicit
in your program of constitutional reform.
I. WAS TRUMP EMPOWERED BY THE HARD-WIRED CONSTITUTION OR BY
THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER?
To what extent is Donald Trump's rise due to dysfunctional features of the
Constitution? Recall the distinction I made in my first letter to you, between the
"hard-wired Constitution" and the constitutional order-the entire set of rules,
225. Heather Digby Parton, The Kris Kobach Factor: Why You Must Get to Know Kansas'
Radical Secretary of State, SALON (July 14, 2016, 8:00 AM), http://www.salon.com/2016/
07/14/thekriskobachfactor why-you must get to know kansasradical_secretary of state/
[https://perma.cc/7DAZ-FVAV].
226. Pardon Information and Instructions, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/




doctrines, and practices that structure political decision making in the United
States. Your argument focuses on altering the hard-wired Constitution through
amendments or a new constitutional convention. By contrast, I argue that
constitutional reform should focus on features of the constitutional order.
The best explanations for Trump's rise concern our current constitutional
order, but they have little to do with the hard-wired Constitution. We might
divide them into three categories. The first concerns the structure of
contemporary media.227 The second concerns the structure of the party system.228
The third concerns where we are in political time-the decline of the conservative
Reagan coalition and regime, and the gradual emergence of a new coalition and
regime that will probably (but not necessarily) be dominated by the Democratic
Party.2 29
A. The Structure of Mass Media
Over the past several decades, conservatives, frustrated with what they regard
as liberal bias in media and the academy, have developed a separate set of
conservative media, think tanks, and educational institutions. Coupled with the
rise of cable news, the Internet, and geographical self-sorting, these institutions
have created a conservative echo chamber.230 They have encouraged motivated
reasoning, and helped to insulate conservatives from facts, opinions, and
interpretations of facts contrary to their ideology and beliefs.2' These conditions
primed Republican primary voters for takeover by a demagogue like Trump.
Although Trump appears to be a buffoon, he is actually extremely skilled at
media manipulation, not only of conservative media, but of media in general.232
Trump knows how to use social media to speak directly to his followers, maintain
audience attention, make hit-and-run attacks on his political adversaries, and
continually change the subject when faced with the consequences of his previous
controversial statements and actions.233
Advertiser-driven media depend on ratings and clicks; they need to create and
extend controversies in order to compete for increasingly scarce audience
227. See infra Part I.A.
228. See infra Part I.B.
229. See infra Part I.C.
230. See Conor Friedersdorf, How Conservative Media Lost to the MSMand Failed the Rank
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attention. Recognizing this, Trump managed to obtain disproportionate amounts
of free media time during the primary season by creating a stream of entertaining
and shocking controversies.234 In the early days of his candidacy, for example,
cable news channels carried substantial portions of his political rallies, vaulting
him into first place in the Republican primaries.235 All other things being equal,
voters are likely to support candidates who are most salient to them, even when
they are controversial; indeed, the more controversial a candidate, the more free
airtime he or she may receive.236 Trump's media savvy allowed him to leap past
a crowded field and win the Republican nomination among the highly partisan
and ideological Republican base.
B. The Party System
Contemporary American politics is strongly polarized and features conflict
extension. Polarization means that the parties are far apart on issues with very
little middle ground for compromise. Conflict extension means that the parties are
polarized on more and more issues, so that if you know a politician's views on
issue A, you also know their views on issue B, even if the two issues are
unrelated.237
Moreover, political polarization is asymmetrical. Although the Democratic
Party has moved to the left in the past two decades, the Republican Party has
moved much farther to the right, and its political base has become increasingly
radical.238
Increasing economic inequality tends to exacerbate political polarization.
239
To the extent that polarization has prevented reforms that would lessen economic
234. Nick Gass, Study: Trump Boosted, Hillary Hurt by Primary Media Coverage, POLITICO
(June 14, 2016, 6:51 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/06/media-study-trump-helped-
clinton-hurt-224300 [https://perma.cc/KK7S-CG8Q].
235. Michael M. Grynbaum, CNN's Coverage ofTrump Was Biased, Presidential Candidates'
Aides Say, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1,2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/01/business/media/trump-
cnns-coverage-biased-presidential-candidates-aides-say.html?_r)= [https://perma.cc/B6NR-96BN]
(describing CNN's coverage of Trump rallies).
236. See John Wihbey & Denise Marie-Ordway, Presidential Debates and their Effects: An
Updated Research Roundup, JOURNALIST'S RESOURCE http://joumalistsresource.org/studies/
politics/elections/presidential-debates-effects-research-roundup [https://perma.cc/2HER-7CH9]
(last updated Sept. 20, 2016) (discussing recent research regarding voter salience and support of
presidential candidates).
237. Geffrey C. Layman & Thomas M. Carsey, Party Polarization and "Conflict Extension"
in the American Electorate, 46 AM. J. POL. Sc. 786, 789 (2002).
238. THOMAS E. MANN &NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT'S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM 51-58
(2012) (describing asymmetric polarization).
239. NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE, AND HOWARD ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED AMERICA:
THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES 3-4 (2d ed. 2016) (explaining how political
polarization and economic inequality lead to and amplify each other).
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inequality, it creates a vicious cycle.240 This creates fertile ground for a politician
like Trump.
C. Political Time
Globalization and the Great Recession exacerbated growing fractures within
the Reagan coalition and the Republican Party. Thus, even as Republicans were
increasingly polarized in opposition to liberals and Democrats, they began to fight
among themselves; and different parts of the Republican coalition were
increasingly at odds with each other. Although many Republican political elites,
donors, and intellectuals continue to press for smaller government, entitlement
reform, lower taxes for the wealthy, free trade, and immigration reform, the
Republican base has developed different priorities. These include opposition to
free trade and immigration, and support for social insurance programs like
Medicare and Social Security, which benefit white working class and middle
class voters.
Trump has seized on the fractures between Republican elites and the
Republican base, catering to the base's values and their sense that they have
repeatedly been betrayed by Republican elites and by politicians who give lip
service to their values but pursue a very different agenda once in power.
It is no accident that Trump's political rise occurs as the Reagan regime that
dominated American politics since 1980 is breaking down, a point I alluded to in
my first letter to you. The demographic coalition that sustained the Reagan
regime has been in decline for some time and is on the verge of becoming a
minority. The successful coalition that Reagan forged is gradually being
supplanted by a new coalition of women, minorities, millennials, professionals
and college-educated people. This coalition swept Barack Obama into office and
increasingly supports the Democratic Party.2 4 '
The long term shift in power between these respective coalitions was already
obvious in the 2012 election; it led to the famous "autopsy" report that argued for
Republicans to expand their base by supporting comprehensive immigration
reform and courting the Latino vote.242 in a now famous quote, a Republican
operative told National Journal's Ronald Brownstein that demographic changes
had eclipsed traditional Republican strategies: "This is the last time anyone will
try to do this"-that is, rely almost exclusively on white voters and appeals to
their anxieties to win a presidential election.2 4 3
Trump, sensing an opportunity, has decided to ignore this advice, double
240. Id. at 3-4.
241. See Ronald Brownstein, The Hidden History of the American Electorate (H7), NAT'L J.
(Aug. 24,2012), https://www.yahoo.com/news/hidden-history-american-electorate-ii-175214333.
html [https://perma.cc/DYR8-2M6N] (describing Obama's "coalition of the ascendant").
242. REPUBLICAN NAT. COMM., GROWTH AND OPPORTUNITY PROJECT 15 (2012).
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down and attempt an overtly white nationalist campaign to garner an even larger
percentage of white voters than Ronald Reagan, the Bushes, or Mitt Romney. He
is making a calculated bet that the Reagan coalition can be revived one more
time; or, more likely, that it can be restructured as a coalition organized around
the South, the Mountain West, and blue collar, non-college educated whites,
especially in the Rust Belt.
As I explained in The Last Days of Disco, the decline of the Republican
Regime and the demographic changes in the American voting population have
caused the Republican Party to experience what we might call either a civil war
or a nervous breakdown.2 44 It is precisely these circumstances that allow a
demagogue like Trump to step forward, promise that he alone can make things
right, and restore the former glory and status of the now decrepit regime and its
constituents. Accordingly, Trump has based his campaign on a politics of fear and
status resentment, aiming his message primarily at conservative white voters,
especially those who lack a college education. Trump stokes their fears about
invasion from Muslim terrorists and Mexican immigrants.
2 4 5 He appeals to their
anxieties about becoming a powerless minority group and suffering a decline in
their previously superior social status as whites. Trump is hardly the first
Republican candidate to engage in a racially tinged status politics directed at
conservative whites.24 6 But because the percentage of white voters in the
population is shrinking,2 4 7 he has been far blunter and more overt in his appeals.
He needs the votes of every white voter he can muster, and therefore he is
shouting what previous candidates used to whisper.
Obviously, one can quibble about the details of these explanations for
Trump's rise. But the more important point is that none of these phenomena are
centrally caused by the hard-wired Constitution. To be sure, the hard-wired
Constitution shapes the conditions in which parties form and party coalitions rise
and fall. And because of the Electoral College, it also shapes how presidential
campaigns are run. But far more important influences are structures of party
competition that are not required by the hard-wired Constitution (which does not
244. Balkin, supra note 16, at 1170.
245. Patrick Healy & Michael Barbaro, Donald Trump Calls for Barring Muslims from
Entering U.S., N.Y. TIMEs (Dec. 7,2015), http://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2015/12/07/
donald-trump-calls-for-banning-muslims-from-entering-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/DW63-545W];
Theofore Schleifer, Trump: Mexican 'Rapists' Coming Now, Middle East 'Terrorists' Coming
Soon, CNN (June 25, 2015, 8:47 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/25/politics/donald-trump-
mexicans-terrorists-immigration-2016/index.html [https://perma.cc/NN8X-ZGDR].
246. See, e.g., MARY D. EDSALLAND THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION: THE IMPACT
OF RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS (1992); Theodore R. Johnson & Leah









mention parties at all), as well as features of mass media that have been far more
driven by technology and economics than by constitutional design.
Both you and I agree, Sandy, that structural features of our constitutional
system shape presidential politics in the United States. But in explaining Trump's
rise, the most important of these structural features are not hard-wired provisions
of the Constitution. The most important features are part of the constitutional
order; they result from statutes, administrative regulations, political conventions,
the organization ofpolitical parties, and court-created constitutional doctrines that
could also be modified by courts. Above all, Trump's rise is the result of
economic, social, and technological factors that sit atop the incentives created by
the hard-wired Constitution. If we want to prevent future demagogues like
Trump, the best remedy is not an Article V amendment, much less a
constitutional convention.
II. PRESIDENTIAL CAESARISM
Although Trump's rise in American politics is consistent with much of the
previous analysis in our exchange, it also highlights tensions in your arguments
for constitutional reform.
In my previous letters I pointed out that your program of constitutional
reform seeks two different things. First, you want to make the constitutional
system more democratic with a small "d." You want to eliminate unnecessary
veto points and blockages in the system, and make it easier for Americans to pass
laws that they need. You also want to enable ordinary individuals to circumvent
elite political institutions through populist devices like the referendum and the
initiative, and through constitutional conventions, which, you hope, could be
staffed by ordinary individuals.
Second, you want sensible legislative solutions and progressive outcomes,
with appropriate protection for civil rights and civil liberties.
In my first letter I pointed out that these two goals are not the same and may
sometimes conflict. Trump's rise as a national political candidate shows us why.
On the one hand, he promises to break through existing political obstacles, re-
energize government, and get things done. On the other, he promises a
frightening politics that bears almost no relationship to sound public policy and
threatens civil rights and civil liberties.
You advert to the problem in your discussion of Max Weber, and his
suggestion that "all systems of 'direct election by the people of the bearer of
supreme power' have within them an impulse . . . toward Caesarism."248 You
argue that Weber's logic applies increasingly to the United States.
There is a little bit of irony in your invocation of Weber. You have argued
that the central problem with our system of government is that it is insufficiently
parliamentary and insufficiently responsive to popular will. You want to break
down the barriers that constrain majorities. Yet the system that you want to move
248. Max Weber, Parliament and Government in Germany Under a New Political Order, in
WEBER: POLITICAL WRITINGS 130, 221 (Peter Lassman & Ronald Spiers eds., 1994).
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towards is the system that Weber thought contained the seeds of Caesarism!
Moreover, if your fear is demagogues and dictators, the last thing you should
be pushing for are national referenda and initiatives. History has shown
repeatedly that when dictators and demagogues eek to consolidate power, they
turn to direct democracy to evade constitutional limitations and demonstrate that
they enjoy the support of the people.249 One can easily imagine Donald Trump
turning to direct democracy to circumvent a polarized Congress and justify one
of his outrageous schemes.
I think that there is a better way to make your point. The framers of our
Constitution created a system of checks and balances to prevent demagogues and
dictators from seizing power, and from working their will if they gained power.
These checks and balances also distinguish American democracy from a
parliamentary system. You point out, however, that this system of checks and
balances has gradually been undermined, especially in foreign affairs, but also
through the expansion of the administrative state. (This is what you mean when
you say that James Madison has left the building.) Moreover, because of partisan
polarization and gridlock, presidents have increasingly turned to the
administrative state to create the effective equivalent of presidential
lawmaking.250 The worse Congressional gridlock becomes, the more presidents
push the envelope of what they can do within the executive branch (including
through waivers and agreements with individual states and localities).25
1 Doing
an end-run around Congress infuriates the President's opponents in Congress
even more. They refuse to cooperate, double down on their intransigence, and the
cycle continues. To be sure, as you and I have argued in our work on
constitutional dictatorship, there are limits to presidential unilateralism, especially
in domestic affairs.252 But that does not keep frustrated presidents from testing
those limits.
The result is a system that has many of the dangers of parliamentarianism
with none of its benefits. Increasingly, Congress fails to be a serious partner in
governing, while the President grows ever more powerful and ever more crucial
to solve the nation's problems. Indeed, in the public's eyes, the President
becomes virtually the sole cause of the country's successes and misfortunes. You
and I have written about America's gradual movement toward a plebiscitary
presidency, in which the President asserts that he or she can lead the country out
249. Margaret Thatcher, quoting Clement Atlee, famously called referendums "a device of
dictators and demagogues." Ian Buruma, The Referendum Charade, THE STRATEGIST (Mar. 10,
2016), https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-referendum-charade/ [https://perma.cc/T7QZ-P599].
250. Gillian E. Metzger, Agencies, Polarization, and the States, 115 COLUM. L. REv. 1739,
1752-54 (2015); Balkin, supra note 16, at 1193-95.
251. Metzger, supra note 250, at 1752-54; JessicaBulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism, 102
VA. L. REV. 953 (2016); David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113
COLUM. L. REv. 265 (2013); Balkin, supra note 16, at 1193-95.
252. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and




of its current problems and into a glorious future.253 In a plebiscitary presidency,
media manipulation becomes increasingly important. Voters pay less attention to
substantive issues (to the extent that they ever did) and more attention to personal
charisma, emotional connection, and grand narratives about the country's
direction. Plebiscitary presidencies also encourage unscrupulous candidates to
engage in status politics, pitting social groups against each other and
manipulating people's fears about potential loss of status. Because, at least in the
short run, social status is a zero-sum good, status politics can make politics more
emotional, volatile, and subject to motivated reasoning. Moreover, reforms to the
system of presidential primaries adopted by both parties in the early 1970s have
made presidential nominations depend much more on the vote of the most
politically mobilized and ideological segments of the general public.2 54 Primary
voters, especially ideologically extreme voters, anxious about their social status,
and seeking reassurance and emotional uplift, may be the most vulnerable to the
blandishments and manipulations of a demagogue like Trump.
People on both sides of the political divide understand the dangers, although
they describe them in different ways. Recently, political conservatives, who had
previously advocated for a powerful and "unitary" executive, have begun to
express great discomfort with the administrative state.2 5 5 Part of this is due to the
fact that conservatives fear that they will not control the executive branch very
often in the near future. But part of it is also due to principled concerns about
long-term threats to representative democracy and to the rule of law.
In the face of these criticisms, liberals should resist the temptation-almost
automatic in today's polarized politics-to engage in reflexive defense of the
status quo. Rather, they should take the critique of the administrative state
seriously. In the face of Congressional obstruction, presidents may have expanded
their lawmaking capacities within the administrative state for lack of any better
alternatives. But doing so has generated a vicious cycle-the more presidents try
to solve problems unilaterally, the more intransigent Congress becomes.2 5 6 And
in the process, this strategy has distorted the system of checks and balances that
guards against abuses by demagogues and would-be dictators. Liberals should be
eager to find ways to remedy these distortions as we move to a less polarized
253. Id. at 1852-55.
254. Raymond J. La Raja, Party Nominating Procedures and Recruitment-State and Local
Level, in L. Sandy Maisel & Jeffrey M. Berry, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN POLITICAL
PARTIES AND INTEREST GROUPS 165, 177 (2010) (noting that closed primaries tend to attract the
most ideologically committed voters).
255. See, e.g., Charles J. Cooper, Confronting the Administrative State, 25 NAT'L AFFAIRS
(2015), http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/confronting-the-administrative-state
[https://perma.cc/XH7A-C6TE]; Michael S. Greve, Yoo to Conservatives: Reverse Course, L.
LIBERTY BLOG (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.libertylawsite.org/2013/0 9/09/yoo-to-conservatives-
reverse-course/ [https://perma.cc/7LUA-XDPF]; John Yoo,A Thousand Little Tyrants-Obama 's
Problems Are a Chance to Rein in the Bureaucracy, NAT'L REV. (Sept. 16, 2013) https://www.
nationalreview.com/nrd/articles/357088/thousand-little-tyrants [https://perma.cc/Y7NR-LNG9].
256. See Balkin, supra note 16, at 1193-95.
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politics-for they will not always be in control of the executive branch either.
Although we differ on the causes, you and I agree that our current political
practices are unsustainable in the long run, and that they create two serious
dangers. The first is that the country will be unable to deal effectively with the
long term problems it faces and the various crises that may confront it from time
to time.
The second problem is that if our system of governance is not reformed, it
will increasingly fail to protect important civil rights and civil liberties. (In saying
this, I do not pretend that it currently protects them adequately.) The dispute
between us is not whether constitutional reform is necessary. It is about what kind
of constitutional reform makes the most sense.
I believe that many of our current problems, but by no means all, will be
ameliorated as we gradually transition from the decaying Reagan regime into a
new regime, whether that new regime turns out to be dominated by Republicans
or Democrats. Then we must begin the long, slow process of making our political
system both more democratic and more republican.
Such a transition will be necessary for any kind of serious constitutional
reform to occur. In fact, the kind of constitutional reforms you seek-Article V
amendments or a new constitutional convention-are nonstarters in our currently
polarized politics. In any case, my hope is that the transition to a new regime will
offer possibilities for reform of the constitutional order that do not require Article
V amendment or a new convention-although, as I noted previously, I am not
opposed to either in principle.
An important part of the solution, therefore, is to maintain constitutional
faith, and allow American politics time to transition, even as we continue to press
for reforms. I advocate patience but not quiescence. We may not be able to do
much in the short term to fix our broken politics-other than trying to hasten the
transition through winning elections. But that is hardly a reason to refrain from
pointing out the many flaws in our political system, and persuading people why
we need to make changes. When reform finally becomes possible, we will need




So our epistolary exchange continues, unexpectedly, for a very simple reason.
The barely imaginable in fact happened, and we now have an ignorant sociopath
as presumptive president-elect257 (and, by the time this issue is actually published,
257. 1 use this rather awkward term because he does not truly become the "President-elect"
until a majority of the various state electors vote for him on December 19. Until then, all we can
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probably as President of the United States). To paraphrase Abraham Lincoln, "we
are now engaged in a great natural experiment to see if the vision of a Republican
Form of Government enunciated in 1776 and then again in 1787 will endure," or
if we are condemned to suffer the fate of most such experiments and decline into
one or another form of authoritarian rule.
The primary constitutional problem presented by Donald Trump, I think we
both agree, is that the American constitutional order, that blend of written
institutional structures and unwritten conventions and political culture, is
supposed to prevent the takeover of our political system by an unscrupulous
demagogue without the slightest qualification to be President. They failed,
largely, I believe, for the reasons you outline; Trump realized better than did any
other candidate that "the traditional media" have become delegitimized by the rise
of "social media" that privileges "truthiness" and, indeed, outright lies, over what
used to be regarded as facts. Similarly, he recognized how the Republican Party
had become vulnerable to a hostile takeover. I would, however, continue to assign
the deficiencies of the 1787 Constitution at least a bit of causal influence in
explaining the sheer level of rage at the breakdown of ordinary governance that
presumably motivated some of the Trump voters to believe they had "nothing to
lose" in rejecting what would almost undoubtedly have turned into four more
years of the status quo given the continuation of divided and gridlocked national
government. As I wrote above, I believe that the pleasure of a Clinton election,
even if accompanied by a Democratic Senate (and thus the recapture of the
Supreme Court) would have been succeeded quickly by depressed recognition
that Paul Ryan and the "Freedom Caucus" would allow her no domestic victories
and that she would, in 2020, be the most vulnerable incumbent at least since
Herbert Hoover in 1932. Now we might hope that that fate is assigned to Donald
Trump!
But I worry about getting to 2020. I do think that we are in the most serious
existential internal crisis since 1860. Significantly more Americans preferred
Hillary Clinton than Donald Trump, but our completely anachronistic Electoral
College tossed the election to the second-place finisher. No sane political system
would adopt such a decision procedure today. The Electoral College, like the
Senate, is a bizarre "affirmative action program" that overweighs the voting
power of small states and the political power of those lucky residents of
"battleground states." The states where most Americans live-think only of
California, Texas, New York, and Illinois, received almost no visits or genuine
consideration from the candidates. More to the point, most of those who opposed
Donald Trump consider him an illegitimate president on both procedural and
substantive grounds. As to the first, he ran the most completely dishonest
campaign in American history. He is a congenital liar who was more than willing
to repeat whatever he thought might gain him the votes of basically ignorant
people who made no effort to check the accuracy of his statements or, even
worse, simply didn't care that they were lies. When one adds to the elemental
say, as a technical matter, is that the odds are very much in his favor, as most people, of course,
mistakenly thought was the case with Hillary Clinton on November 7, 2016.
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dishonesty of the campaign the systematic efforts to suppress the vote in such
Republican bastions as Wisconsin and North Carolina, for starters, then one has
additional reason to doubt the integrity of the overall process, even without taking
into consideration the inanity of Electoral College. But there is also the fact that
Donald Trump is totally without any of the intellectual skills or personal virtues
that we look for in presidents. If he is to be obeyed and taken seriously as
President, it is for the reason set out in King Lear: Even "a dog's obeyed in
office."258
All of this helps to explain why I, and many others, have joined, post-
election, in pleading with Republican electors to save the republic by acting under
the original vision of the Electoral College, i.e., to engage in what Publius in
Federalist No. 1 called "reflection and choice" as to who should take the national
helm rather than simply act like lemmings committed to a potentially suicidal
choice for the nation. Although some, like my friend and sometime colleague
Larry Lessig, have eloquently argued that Hillary Clinton should be selected,
25 9
I think this is a political non-starter, in part because of the sentiment of one
response that I received shortly after the publication, with two University ofP
Texas colleagues, of an op-ed in the New York Daily News endorsing the
proposition that electors should exercise their constitutional right (and duty) to
engage in autonomous choice regarding who should be the next President of the
United States. "They can try and steal it from President Elect Trump," wrote an
angry respondent, "but if they do get ready for Martial Law under Obama because
there are 70 million of us and we'll make the radical left wing riots currently
underway look like a picnic. The Establishment lost this one, deal with it."
2 6 0
What Democrats must realize is that salvation of the republic may rest on the
willingness of sufficient Republican electors to identify a palatable alternative to
Trump who can gain enough votes to deprive him of his electoral vote majority
and throw the election into a Republican-dominated House of Representatives.
Perhaps the writer quoted above would be equally hostile to that kind of deal,
since it would, after all, send Donald Trump back to Fifth Avenue and Mar-a-
Lago instead of to the Oval Office. Are there enough devoted Trumpistas, with
guns,, who will threaten significant civic disorder in such a case? The only
plausible answer is "perhaps," which is not encouraging and may lead one to
counsel simply accepting Trump's election.
In any event, I do believe that, at least psychologically, we are at the brink of
civil war inasmuch as critical masses on both right and left basically look at their
258. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR act 4, sc. 6 ("Thou hast seen a farmer's dog bark
at a beggar? ... And the creature run from the cur? There thou mightst behold the great image of
authority: a dog's obeyed in office.").
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fellow Americans as enemies who must be stopped at almost any cost. This, to
put it mildly, is not ordinary politics. It represents the breakdown of a functioning
political system that relies on a certain code of what might be described as a
willingness to be a "good sport" after losing an election and saying, as did the
fans first of the Brooklyn Dodgers and then the Chicago Cubs, "wait 'til next
year"-and "next year" finally came for both teams, of course. Is that a good
enough reason to roll over and accept the verdict of the minority of the American
voters who voted for the sociopath? It all depends on how dangerous one believes
that Trump and his minions are, and I believe they are dangerous indeed.
How, if he becomes President, might the civil war begin, since there will
certainly be no Fort Sumter to signal the beginning, and a California vote for
secession apparently won't take place until 2019. I think the most likely
beginning would be reminiscent of the violence in the streets of Boston over the
rendition of fugitive slaves like Anthony Burns.261 After all, one should be clear
that Burns violated the law by fleeing his confinement as a slave, and the august
Supreme Court, in the worst single decision in our history upheld the Fugitive
Slave Law of 1793 in Prigg v. Pennsylvania.2 62 Abraham Lincoln himself, the
Great Emancipator, declared that Republicans had a duty to concede the
constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Law inasmuch as it was in effect part of the
deal that had been made with the slaveowners in order to get the Constitution in
the first place.2 63 Many Bostonians (and Wisconsites) disagreed and moved, in
effect, to nullify the operation of federal law with regard to fugitive slaves. So do
a fast forward to 2017, and imagine that peaceful families of undocumented aliens
start being rounded up and sent to concentration camps prior to their deportation.
Many of us, I hope, would see it as our duty to stand in solidarity with them and
prevent the legal authorities from being able to carry out their own legal "duties."
Federal authorities should become aware of the absolute contempt in which they
are held by one group within the community even as, undoubtedly, there would
also be many people cheering them on.
Perhaps this is all too melodramatic, even apocalyptic. President Obama
himself has apparently reassured his own daughters that this, too, will pass, that
America is too resilient to be permanently deflected from moving further along
the arc of justice.2 6 4 I obviously hope he is right. Donald Trump, after all, seems
primarily to be rapaciously devoted to amassing greater and greater wealth, and
he clearly views the presidency as a path to enhanced fame and fortune. New
American wars, and especially a world war, would not be conducive to his
261. See, e.g., Boston Combusts: The Fugitive Slave Case of Anthony Burns, HISTORYNET
(Apr. 19,2007), http://www.historynet.com/boston-combusts-the-figitive-slave-case-of-anthony-
burns.htm [https://perma.cc/TJ29-XS63].
262. 41 U.S. 539 (1842).
263. Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, LINCOLN STUD. (Sept. 18, 2007), http://lincolnstudies.
blogspot.com/2007/09/fugitive-slave-act-of-1850.html [https://perma.cc/WY2L-ATBP].
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financial gain. In the meantime, concerned Democrats must do everything they
can to identify and work with those honorable Republicans who actually meant
"never Trump." If there are only half a dozen in the Senate, then Trump's worst
appointments (or at least those requiring Senate confirmation) can be blocked.
Undoubtedly this will mean that Democrats themselves will have to acquiesce in
some conservative programs they would ordinarily do everything in their power
to oppose. That, for better or worse, is what serious compromise entails. The
original Constitution came into being only because its proponents were willing
to compromise with slaveowning states (thorough the three-fifths rule, most
notably) and small states (through equal voting power in the Senate). One can
make a serious argument that the Constitution wasn't worth it, especially since
we live every single day today with the consequences of both of those
compromises. But perhaps it was. There are times when pacts with the devil are
necessary, as with the alliance with Josef Stalin against Adolf Hitler. Nothing that
Al Qaeda could do so threatens the American fabric as does Donald Trump and
the truly deplorable part of his base, even if we take necessary care to concede'
that they may represent only a relatively small subset of the larger number of:
people who voted for him in their understandable desire to remonstrate (a true
euphemism) against elites of both parties that had almost willfully ignored their
plight in the rush toward globalization. No doubt many of those who voted for the
Nazis in 1933 also had "understandable reasons" to do so. It really didn't matter
once they seized power through legal means.
Please persuade me that I'm wrong to be so anxious about our country and its





We began this exchange over a year ago by asking whether American
democracy has become dysfunctional. Along the way, we have debated what
"dysfunction" means, and whether the causes of dysfunction lie in our
Constitution or in other aspects of our political system. We have also debated
whether the causes of dysfunction are "hard-wired"--requiring an Article V
amendment or convention to repair--or whether the solutions lie in some
combination of political reform, mobilization, perseverance and persistence.
The 2016 election has confirmed that American democracy is dysfunctional. But
it has confirmed it in a most unexpected way. Both of us assumed that Hillary
Clinton would win the presidency and that we would face four years of political
gridlock and trench warfare. What has happened instead is that Americans have
elected a demagogue to the presidency.
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I. THE FRAGILITY OF REPUBLICS
The Founders, steeped in the history of the rise and fall of republics, worried
that something like this could and would come to pass. Republics, they believed,
are delicately calibrated instruments of political power that require perpetual
vigilance and civic virtue to maintain.2 65 Civic virtue means devotion to the public
good and the ability and the willingness to sacrifice short-term political self-
interest for the greater good of the Res Publica-the public thing that
simultaneously constitutes and motivates a well ordered state.2 66
The famous quip, attributed to Benjamin Franklin, that the Framers had
founded "[a] republic,... if you can keep it," 26 7 adverted to the history of the rise
and fall of republics, and the difficulty of maintaining them over long periods of
time. Speaking at the conclusion of the 1787 Convention, Franklin predicted that
the new government "is likely to be well administered for a course of years, and
can only end in Despotism, as other forms have done before it, when the people
shall become so corrupted as to need despotic Government, being incapable of
any other."268
Why are republics difficult to keep? Republics are always subject to
corruption: corruption of civic officials, who seek to promote their own interests
and entrench themselves in power; and corruption of the citizens, who become
cynical, internally divided, and lose faith in the idea of a common good and in the
possibility of a common project of governance involving their fellow citizens.2 69
The corruption of republics involves more than dishonesty and selfishness.
Above all, it involves a loss of faith-faith in the ability and the good will of
leaders and public institutions, and faith in the good will of one's fellow citizens.
Loss of faith and selfishness go together- the one exacerbates the other. In a
republic sliding into corruption, citizens look around them and all they see are
smug, dishonest elites, scheming politicians, condescending cosmopolitans and
baskets of deplorables. Because the people have lost faith in public institutions,
in their fellow citizens, in the possibility of working for common ends-indeed,
265. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION.OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 68
(1969) ("A republic was a delicate polity precisely because it demanded an extraordinary moral
character in the people.").
266. Thomas Paine, The Rights ofMan: Being an Answer to Mr. Burke'sAttackon the French
Revolution (1791), in COLLECTED WRITINGS 565 (Eric Foner ed., 1995) ("RES-PUBLICA, the public
affairs, or the public good; or literally translated, the public thing ... refer[s] to what ought to be
the character and business of government.").
267. WALTER ISAACSON, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN: AN AMERICAN LIFE 459 (2003).
268. 2 TH-E RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 641 (September 17, 1787)
(Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966).
269. See J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT
AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 527 (1975) ("Virtue can develop only in time, but is
always threatened with corruption by time."); WOOD, supra note 265, at 105 ("Precisely because
republics required civic virtue and disinterestedness among their citizens, they were very fragile
polities, extremely liable to corruption.").
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in the very idea of achieving a common good-they become selfish, clannish,
angry, suspicious, despairing and distrustful. Their attitudes and actions further
corrode faith in public institutions and in the republic, and the cycle of corruption
continues.27
In the traditional account, as republics decay into ever greater corruption, the
public hungers for strong leadership to repair what has fallen into disrepair. Their
desire to set things right encourages the rise of unscrupulous demagogues, who
offer blandishments and lies; they promise that they will restore the republic's
lost glory through the sheer force of their will.
27 '
Demagogues do not usually sneak up unawares. Members of the public often
know that demagogues are selfish, unethical, and unscrupulous, but they convince
themselves that turning to such leaders is the only way to smash corrupt
institutions and solve the country's problems. Once in power, however,
demagogues become tyrants, bringing republican government to an end.
This is the traditional story of how republics decay and fall. The story was
well known to the founders of our country.2 7 2 They hoped that they could create
a new kind of republic that would resist the natural tendencies toward decay in
all republics throughout history. The devices they hoped would prevent this fate
included a large federal republic that would diffuse and temper factionalism,
federalism, separation of powers, checks and balances, and institutions of civil
society that would inculcate virtue in the citizenry and instill respect for
education, learning, and accomplishment.2 73
How well does the traditional account of the decay of republics match our
present situation? The resemblance is altogether frightening. Republican themes
have been implicit in our entire exchange of letters about democracy and
dysfunction. Government dysfunction has caused-and been caused by-political
polarization, factionalism, the corruption of the political process, and the public's
loss of faith in public institutions and in the public good. Decades of politicians
270. PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 210 (1997)
(explaining that in the republican tradition corruption occurs when people "make their decisions
by reference not to considerations of the common good but rather to more sectional or private
concerns").
271. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 1 (Hamilton) ("[O]f those men who have overturned the
liberty of republics, the greatest number have begun their career by paying an obsequious court to
the people, commencing demagogues and ending tyrants."); STAN VAN Hoorr, HOPE (THE ART OF
LIVING) 96 (2014) ("Promising to save their people from oppression and exploitation, to bring an
end to their humiliation and defeats, to restore the dignity and power of their race ... has always
been the modus operandi of fascist demagogues and populist rabble-rousers.").
272. See JAMES W. CEASER, PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION: THEORY ANDDEVELOPMENT 61(1979)
("The possibility of a national demagogue was one of the greatest fears of the Founders and literally
frames The Federalist, being mentioned in both the first and last numbers.").
273. Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELLL. REV. 341, 352 (2009)
("The Constitution was intended to provide structural encouragements to keep the logic and
language of society as a whole from becoming corrupt, representing a technical and moral response
to what they saw as a technical and moral problem.").
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exacerbating political polarization for short-term political gain, elite arrogance,
institutional failure, and loss of public faith have spewed forth a demagogue
whose populist appeals, brash personality and dishonest actics almost perfectly
fit the classical description. Not only has the demagogue taken over one of the
two major political parties, he has actually won the presidency.
The framers knew that corruption comes to republics both from within and
from without. They understood that foreign powers would be happy to sow
confusion and disorder within a republic to benefit their interests.2 74 This fear has
also been realized in 2016. Amazing as it seems, there is evidence that the
Russian government engaged in a systematic disinformation campaign to confuse
and mislead the American electorate, and to help to throw the election to Donald
Trump, widely thought to be more pro-Russian than Hillary Clinton.2 75
In short, democratic dysfunction, and what the founders would have called
republican corruption, has brought forth a demagogue. According to the familiar
story, the next step is that the demagogue becomes a tyrant, and the tyrant ends
republican government.
Is that how the story continues?
II. REPUBLICAN FAILSAFES AND REPUBLICAN INSURANCE
You fear the worst, Sandy, and raise the specter of secession and civil war.
274. Cf THEFEDERALISTNO. 68 (Hamilton) ("[E]very practicable obstacle should be opposed
to cabal, intrigue, and corruption. These most deadly adversaries of republican government might
naturally have been expected to make their approaches from more than one quarter, but chiefly
from the desire in foreign powers to gain an improper ascendant in our councils."). In his Farewell
Address, George Washington connected the dangers offaction with the dangers offoreign influence
that might capitalize on it: factionalism "opens the door to foreign influence and corruption, which
find a facilitated access to the government itself through the channels of party passions. Thus the
policy and the will of one country are subjected to the policy and will of another." George
Washington, Farewell Address (1796), AVALON PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th
century/washing.asp [https://perma.cc/3HfUR-T65A].
275. Adam Entous et al., Secret CIA Assessment Says Russia Was Trying to Help Trump Win
White House, WASH. PosT (Dec. 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/obama-orders-review-of-russian-hacking-during-presidential-campaign/2016/
12/09/31 d6b300-be2a- 11 e6-94ac-3d324840106c story.html?utmterm=.fd46ca7d3b23
[https://perma.cc/4MNC-UEWK] ("The CIA has concluded in a secret assessment that Russia
intervened in the 2016 election to help Donald Trump win the presidency, rather than just to
undermine confidence in the U.S. electoral system."); Craig Timberg, Russian PropagandaEeffort
Helped Spread 'Fake News' During Election, Experts Say, WASH. POsT (Nov. 24, 2016)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/russian-propaganda-effort-helped-spread-fake-
news-during-election-experts-say/2016/1 1/24/793903b6-8a40-4ca9-b7 12-
716af66098fe story.html?utm term=.81bb60ab8cca [https://perma.cc/H73P-45D7] ("[A]
sophisticated Russian propaganda campaign ... created and spread misleading articles online with
the goal of punishing Democrat Hillary Clinton, helping Republican Donald Trump and
undermining faith in American democracy.").
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I do not argue that the prospects for American democracy are particularly bright
in the near term. But the familiar story of the decline and fall of republics is not
destined to be our fate, at least not yet.
Remember that the American Constitution-the very constitution that you
have so eloquently criticized-is not simply a set of procedures for self-
governance. Our Constitution was also designed to be a device for resisting
demagogues. It trades off the best possible system of democratic governance in
order to avoid the worst.
A constitution is designed to make politics possible.27 6 It is designed to make
people engage in politics rather than have the struggle for power degenerate into
anarchy, dictatorship, or violence. A well-designed republican constitution,
accordingly, is designed to make republics possible, and to keep them operating
as republics over time, despite the multiple temptations and corruptions that
republics historically suffer. Such a constitution may be awkward in many
respects. But that is acceptable if the awkwardness buys insurance against
republican corruption-because that corruption, unchecked, leads to tyranny,
anarchy, and civil war.
This point about constitutional structures as insurance against demagogues
is the converse of an argument you have often made about the undemocratic
defects of our constitutional system. You point out that there are several features
of the Constitution that may not cause serious problems in the ordinary course of
affairs. Yet, as you have often reminded me, building a house on a hundred-year
flood plain involves the risk that, every hundred years or so, there will be a flood
that will destroy your property. In the same way, you point out that, every now
and then, undemocratic features of the Constitution may seriously frustrate
democratic will.27 7 This risk motivates your argument for reforming our.
constitutional system to get rid of its inefficient and undemocratic features.
But the flip side of this argument is that certain features of a constitution may
not merely be kludges or inefficient compromises that undermine democracy.
Rather, they may trade off democratic efficiency in the ordinary course of affairs
for political failsafes. Such political failsafes keep the struggle for power within
republican politics rather than spinning out of control into tyranny and civil war.
These features of our constitutional system are often described as slowing
down politics and making change more difficult. But many of these features do
more than simply block precipitous action; they also give many different people
and groups a stake in governance so that they have reason to continue to work
within the political constitution rather than outside it. These failsafes are a kind
of republican insurance. They act as checks on situations that may only rarely
come to pass, but they serve as security for moments when, to borrow your
metaphor, great political floods threaten to overwhelm the entire republic.
276. Balkin, supra note 150, at 243.
277. Cf Sanford Levinson, What Are We ToDoAbout Dysfunction? Reflections on Structural
Constitutional Change and the Irrelevance of Clever Lawyering, 94 B.U. L. REv. 1127, 1132
(2014) (comparing Constitution to a car with defective brakes, and arguing that "the Constitution
is long overdue for a 'trip to the shop"').
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You might think of a well-designed constitution like a well-designed
cybersecurity system. A computer system connected to the Internet is constantly
being bombarded by various kinds of cyber attacks. Viruses and worms are
always trying to infect it. Social engineers-that is, con artists and tricksters-are
always trying to hack the system through ruses and tricks. (Apparently this is how
the DNC and John Podesta's e-mails were hacked).27 A good security
system-there is no perfect system-tries to ward off these constant attacks as
best it can, and it inevitably trades off other goods in order to achieve a decent
modicum of security.
Like most well-designed security systems, a good system for defending
republican government does not have a single door with a single lock to be
picked. Rather it has multiple layers and perimeters of defense.279 Some of these
defenses are hard-wired into the constitutional text, while others, although not
hard-wired, are part of the constitution of settlement. Many, if not most of them,
make the system more undemocratic in your terms. Yet, to continue to metaphor
of computer security, what you have described as bugs in the American
constitutional system can also be understood as a features.
Some of the defenses in our constitutional system prevent demagogues from
ever achieving political prominence. Others prevent them from being placed on
the ballot as candidates in a general election. Others keep them from being
elected. And still others limit what demagogues can do once they achieve office.
Several of these constitutional defenses, designed to prevent demagogues
from ever gaining power, have already fallen in the course of the 2016 election.
But others do not kick in until the demagogue becomes President. The question
we now face is whether these remaining defenses will hold. There is still hope.
And if we get to the 2020 and 2024 elections intact, with checks and balances,
with functioning courts, with a smooth rotation of political power, in which the
losers leave office peacefully and the winners don't exact revenge on them, our
system will have proved robust as a constitution against demagogues. Don't get
me wrong: a great deal may have been lost or damaged in the process, but the
republic will have survived. In situations like the present, one has to scale back
one's ambitions, and defend the core of the constitutional project.
One of the ironies of our exchange as it has developed over the course of a
year is that you find yourself arguing for the use of these failsafes, these defenses
278. Ben Gilbert, Hillary Clinton's Campaign Got Hacked by Fallingfor the Oldest Trick in
the Book, Bus. INSIDER(Oct. 31,2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/hillary-clinton-campaign-
john-podesta-got-hacked-by-phishing-2016-10 [https://perma.cc/6ENP-XAZF] ("Phishing is a
hacking tactic that is actually older than computer-based hacking, and it involves simple social
engineering.").
279. See, e.g., JAMES S. TILLER, THE ETHICAL HACK: A FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS VALUE
PENETRATION TESTING 45-46 (2004) (describing defense-in-depth approaches with multiple layers
of security); Nimmy Reichenberg, Four TipsforDesigning a Secure NetworkPerimeter, SECURITY
WEEK (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.securityweek.com/four-tips-designing-secure-network-
perimeter [https://perma.cc/ZA7D-F9TE] ("A sound network security perimeter architecture
requires multiple layers of defense.").
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of republican government. Neither of us likes the Electoral College, and you have
identified it as a key example of what is undemocratic about our Constitution. In
2006, for example, you wrote that "the Electoral College ... supplies the decisive
and overriding reason for rejecting the status quo and supporting a convention
entitled to propose significant revisions. It is an undemocratic and perverse part
of the American system of government that ill serves the United States."
280
Nevertheless, in today's desperate circumstances, you argue that public-spirited
individuals and groups should push for members of the Electoral College to
support someone other than Donald Trump on December 19th. Consistent with
the republican tradition of devotion to the common good, you argue that liberals
and Democrats should put aside their short-term self-interest and get behind a
consensus candidate from the Republican party, because that is the best way to
ensure that the nation will accept the legitimacy of the result.
Denying Trump an Electoral College majority, in turn, would throw the
presidential election into the House of Representatives, in which each state
delegation would have one vote.2 8' California and Wyoming would have an equal
say in who becomes our next president-a system of voting every bit as
undemocratic as the malapportioned Senate. Your hope is that the House would
pick an alternative to Trump-even someone who had never faced the voters in
2016. In 2006, you stated your staunch opposition to this particular feature of our
Constitution; indeed, you called it "a national constitutional crisis just waiting to
happen."282
In ordinary times-indeed, as recently as a year ago-you would have
pointed to the Electoral College and the House's power to choose the President
as some of the worst features of our Constitution because they are so deeply in
conflict with democratic norms. But, as you have pointed out, these are not
ordinary times. And the argument in your last letter makes the case for the
importance of republican failsafes in a democratic constitution.
Even so, I am skeptical about your particular solution. The Electoral College
and the House of Representatives might have helped to preserve republican
government in the early 1800s. After all, in the election of 1800 they eventually
gave us Thomas Jefferson rather than Aaron Burr. But it is less likely that they
will have the same effect in 2016. Neither the Electoral College nor the House of
Representatives offers a very significant chance of preventing Trump's election.
The solution you propose requires a great deal of coordination among strangers,
and it requires that the Republican Party quickly converge on a consensus
candidate in opposition to Trump, something the party was conspicuously unable
to do throughout the Republican primary process.
Beyond the Electoral College, however, lie many other failsafes in our
constitutional system. Most of them form part of what you call the constitution
of settlement; some of them are hard-wired into the Constitution and would
require an Article V amendment o change. You would probably regard almost
280. LEvrNSON, supra note 54, at 82.
281. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
282. LEVINSON, supra note 54, at 91.
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all of them as either undemocratic or as unduly limiting the ability of We the
People to act expeditiously to realize their will.
Ell. REPUBLICAN DEFENSE
What are these remaining defenses? They include the staggered system of
elections for President, Senate and House; the requirements of bicameralism and
presentment; the internal rules of the Senate and House,283 the filibuster, and the
various limitations on the use of the reconciliation procedure to get around the
filibuster.284
Other defenses arise from our federal system: separate state governments with
multiple offices that answer to different constituencies than the federal
government, and the practical necessity of power sharing between federal and
state governments in a host of federal programs.285 These practical features of
federalism are far more important to the preservation of republican government
than the entire history of judicial attempts at protecting state sovereignty or
imposing dual federalism. They protect republicanism by continuously generating
a cadre of opponents to contest the dominant regime, and by giving these
opponents a stake in engaging in politics within the system rather than outside of
it. As long as the opposition party can exert influence in state and local
government, it is never fully shut out of politics.286 It can live to fight another day.
Indeed, the party system often operates counter-cyclically: as one party dominates
the presidency, the other often makes gains in Congress, and especially in state
and local governments.287
When Trump takes office in January 2017, Republicans will control both
283. Balkin, supra note 16, at 1166.
284. For a valuable discussion, see David Super's three-part series on Balkinization. David
Super, Inside the Strange World of "Reconciliation," BALKINIZATION (Dec. 4, 2016),
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2016/12 /inside-strange-world-of-reconciliation.html
[https://perma.cc/MLY9-67WZ]; David Super, How Reconciliation Works: What it Can and
Cannot Do, BALKINIZATION (Dec. 5, 2016), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2016/12/how-
reconciliation-works-what-it-can.html [https://perma.cc/J59L-CSMK]; David Super, What thelNew
Majority Will Do-And How They Will Do It, BALKINIZATION (Dec. 6, 2016), https://balkin.
blogspot.com/2016/12/what-new-majority-will-do-and-how-they.html [https://perma.cc/5KT5-
W3Y6].
285. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State
Implementation ofFederal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534 (2011); Jessica
Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256 (2009);
Heather K. Gerken, OfSovereigns and Servants, 115 YALE L.J. 2633 (2006).
286. Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1745 (2005).
287. Larry J. Sabato, Why Parties Should Hope They Lose the White House, POLITICO (Dec.
1,2014), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/12/presidents-bad-for-their-parties- 113241
#ixzz3Pqkfx2ja [https://perma.cc/5F7M-ZBAJ] (arguing that "the surest price the ... party
[winning the White House] will pay is defeat of hundreds of their most promising candidates and
officeholders for Senate, House, governorships, and state legislative posts").
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Houses of Congress and most state legislatures. But a regular system of staggered
elections-every two years for the House, every four for the President, and every
six for the Senate-is hard-wired into the Constitution. This distinguishes our
presidential system from the sort of parliamentary systems you favor. It
guarantees that it is very difficult for one party to hold on to all of the levers of
power for an extended period of time. It makes revolutionary change difficult,
unless the people keep returning the same party to power over and over again.
The staggered system of elections is the Constitution's most overlooked
weapon against the rise of dictatorship. Generally speaking, the President's party
usually loses seats in Congress during the mid-term elections. If President Trump
proves incompetent or unpopular, he may well lose control of one or both houses
of Congress by 2018. Even if that doesn't happen-because of gerrymandered
House districts and the large number of Senate seats Democrats must defend in
2018- the Democrats might still gain enough seats to make it difficult for
Republicans to pass legislation through Republican votes alone. At that point,
many of Trump's most dangerous plans will be off the table.
The 2018 and 2020 elections are especially important because they,'will
determine who draws the redistricting maps for both state and federal elections
in the next decade. Republicans leveraged their successes in the 2010 election to
lock in a partisan advantage both in state legislatures and in the House of
Representatives. Democrats have a chance to undo some of those advantages in
the next decade.
These structural defenses can't prevent everything, of course. As you and I
have written in our work on constitutional dictatorship, over the years Congress
has delegated so much control to the White House that in many aspects of
domestic and foreign policy the President can act unilaterally.
2 8 8 The sad fact is
that Trump doesn't need to innovate all that much to cause a great deal of damage
to our national interests-he can rely on the techniques that previous presidents
have developed. Many of these techniques were developed by presidents who
faced increasing gridlock, government inertia, and congressional irresponsibility.
But tools crafted with best of intentions can still be abused by later presidents.
We can only guess what Trump will do with the quasi-dictatorial powers of the
modern presidency. (At the same time, executive overreach will open up another
potential site of resistance-through judicial review of the administrative state.)
And then there is the elephant in the room: the possibility of another terrorist
attack on American soil. Unlike George W. Bush, Trump might be blamed for it,
further diminishing his ability to govern effectively. But it is also possible that he
will use the attack as an opportunity to expand the powers of the President and
limit civil liberties. He will rally his supporters, find his scapegoats, and demand
the power to act quickly and effectively. He will confuse energy and initiative
with cruelty and self-aggrandizement, as demagogues so often do.
288. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 252, at 1813-14 ("the expansion of presidential
authority ... has come through the creation of framework statutes by Congress that ... delegate
vast authority to the President.").
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IV. How To DEFEAT A DEMAGOGUE
There are no guarantees, but the system of staggered elections is among the
most important defenses the American Constitution presents to demagogic
ambitions. In a parliamentary system, one might hope to generate a vote of no-
confidence and cause the leader's government to fall. But in the American
system, the most important thing one can do to counter a demagogue is to win
successive elections at both the state and federal level.
Complaining that Trump is arrogant, ignorant, uncouth, and corrupt is not the
most likely means of winning those elections. Trump's supporters already know
that he is arrogant, ignorant, uncouth and corrupt, but they voted for him anyway.
They supported him because they wanted dramatic change that would make their
lives better. Some of the people who voted for him didn't like him at all, but
merely regarded him as the lesser of two evils; they hoped against their better
judgment that he could change things for the better.
Understanding all this is the key to the proper political strategy. The way to
defeat Trump is not to reveal him as a vulgarian, or even as corrupt or self-
dealing, but to fight him on grounds of policy. His power is his promise of
change. Explode the promise and his magic dissipates.
It is not enough to show that Trump is a hypocrite-one must show that he
is an ineffective hypocrite. Demonstrate that his promises of change were illusory,
and that his policies hurt the very people who supported him. Make people want
to give the other party a chance, just as they have done so many times before.
This was the sword that Trump wielded against Hillary Clinton; and it is the
weapon that might be wielded against Trump. Trump enters the White House
without a popular majority, and with some of the lowest net favorability ratings
of any first-term President in recent American history.289 A majority of the public
is already skeptical of him, and may turn on him if he cannot quickly bring
significant reform to an increasingly restless America.
The credibility of a demagogue like Trump stems from his promise to shake
up the lethargy of government, to bring change, and to improve people's lives.
The source of his power is also the source of his greatest vulnerability. To defeat
him, one must bog him down, divert him, frustrate him, waste his energies.
I have argued that Trump appears at the end of the Reagan regime; he enters
the White House when his party's coalition is weak and factionalized.2 9 0
289. Jonathan Easley, Trump's Popularity Spikes, but Lags Behind Past Presidents, THE HILL
(Dec. 8,2016), http://thehill.comI/homenews/campaign/309319-trumps-popularity-spikes-but-lags-
behind-past-presidents [https://perma.cc/3APN-633N] ("Trump's net favorability rating is the
lowest of any newly elected first-term president, likely because he was a controversial candidate
who caused divisions in his own party."); Views ofPresident-Elect Trump and His Administration,
PEw REs. CTR. (Dec. 8,2016), http://www.people-press.org/2016/12/08/1-views-of-president-elect-
trump-and-his-administration/ [https://perma.cc/42CQ-HDJT] ("Trump's rating for the job he has
done so far presenting his vision to the public is lower than those other recent presidents received
following their elections.").
290. Jack M. Balkin, What Kind ofPresident Will Donald Trump Become, Part I-Donald
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Therefore, I believe that he is primed for what Stephen Skowronek calls the
politics of disjunction, in which a President allied with an aging political regime
promises to restore its dominance and former greatness, is unable to keep all of
the factions of his party together, and as a result presides over the regime's
dissolution.291 Disjunctive presidencies are usually failures; the opposition party
successfully repudiates them, producing a new and robust political regime to
replace them.292
There are good reasons to believe that Trump will face a disjunctive situation,
bringing the Reagan era to a close.293 He fits many features of the ideal type. For
example, although nominally affiliated with a decaying regime, "the actions these
presidents take on their own behalf are as disruptive to the status quo as any."
294
Indeed, Skowronek notes, "one of the great ironies of the politics of disjunction
is that the presidents who come to office in these sorts of situations tend to have
only the most tenuous relationship to the establishments they represent."
29 5
"Long-festering problems within the regime"296 tend to produce leaders "only
nominally affiliated with it." 29 7 In trying to fix the country's problems,..they
"often press major departures of their own from the standard formulas and
priorities set in the old agenda."298
As differences within the coalition become increasingly obvious and difficult
to manage, disjunctive candidates argue that they are able to fix things because
they have special technical abilities.299 For example, they might portray
themselves as extremely skilled diplomats and politicians (John Quincy Adams,
James Buchanan), outstanding technocrats and problem solvers (Herbert Hoover,
Jimmy Carter); or, as in Trump's case, outstanding deal makers. They explain to
the public that what is important is not ideological purity but the ability to get
things done.
In like fashion, Trump has used his image as a successful businessman who
is good at making deals to assuage different parts of the Republican coalition. As
Skowronek puts it, in the last days of a regime, mastery of technique-in this case
deal making and business acumen--"is a hallmark of the politics of
disjunction.""' Focusing on technique allows the new President to remain
ambiguous about wvhat he or she stands for. This allows each side of the coalition
Trump and the Politics of Disjunction, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 14, 2016), https://balkin.blogspot.
com/2016/1 1/what-kind-of-president-will-trump.html [https://perma.cc/8U52-WP59].
291. See STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN
ADAMS TO BILL CLINTON 39-40 (3d prtg. 2000).
292. Id. at 39-41.
293. Balkin, supra note 290.





299. The next three paragraphs are adapted from Balkin, supra note 290.
300. SKOWRONEK, supra note 291, at 40.
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to believe that it will get what it wants from the new presidency.
Unfortunately, the politics of disjunction presents a gauntlet that is close to
impossible to traverse successfully. Disjunctive presidents are caught between the
demands of increasingly antagonistic factions, whom they cannot all please
simultaneously. Technique is not enough to keep the coalition together or
maintain its legitimacy. Being a great deal maker, for example, is not enough if
people don't like the deals, or if they come to believe that you have sold them out.
Eventually such presidents discover they cannot maintain public support; they are
undone by internal divisions within their own party, resistance from the
opposition party, and the unexpected calamities that befall every presidency.
There are no guarantees that Trump will fit into a predetermined ideal type.
He has confounded expectations many times before. Nevertheless, our best hope
is to act on these assumptions about where we stand in political time. History will
not take care of itself; these kinds of leaders fail because people actively oppose
them. They fail because their political coalition begins weakened and falls apart
in the face of constant political opposition. If Trump's political coalition is
fractious, one must prevent it from coalescing and regaining strength. One must
work continuously to split his coalition, by highlighting the choices that divide
congressional Republicans, by finding common ground with NeverTrumpers, and
by peeling off people who only viewed Trump as the lesser of two evils.
Above all, to defeat a demagogue whose power comes from the promise of
change, one must make change difficult, and impede the smooth progress of his
Administration's ambitions. In constitutional terms, one must use all of the tools
in the American constitutional system to hinder, delay, and frustrate his efforts.
To defeat a demagogue like Trump, in other words, one must use the tools that
you, Sandy, have repeatedly denounced as making our Constitution
undemocratic. In a period of abnormal politics, our goal is not a frictionless path
for official action; instead, we must defend the republic.
This brings our discussion full circle, back to the issues that began our debate.
Without defending all of the undemocratic features of our constitutional system,
let me suggest that at least some of them serve as crucial insurance for
republicanism. The next few years will demonstrate their value, and your
proposals to eliminate or displace them are badly timed.
For example, you have previously supported the idea of national referenda
to circumvent a stagnant political process. But nothing could be more dangerous
when a demagogue holds the reins of power. There is nothing a demagogue likes
more than to circumvent established forms of lawmaking to project his power and
identify his will with the will of the people.
You have also argued for a constitutional convention to propose new
amendments. But calling for a constitutional convention just as a demagogue has
won the presidency is the worst possible example of political timing. Trump won
the 2016 election because he fired up a populist political movement that endorses
his call to blow up the system. His followers will surely be major participants in
any new constitutional convention. At best the convention would be futile,
because the country is now too deeply divided to achieve ratification by three
quarters of the states. At worst it would be dangerous, because Trump's ability
to influence both the convention and Republican-controlled state legislatures
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might result in authoritarian changes to our constitutional system. Even if you are
correct that we need new constitutional amendments, the moment for an Article
V convention can't arise until the demagogue is thoroughly defeated and
discredited.
V. CONCLUSION: A MACHINE THAT WOULD NOT Go OF ITSELF
There is a famous conceit that the framers sought to create a republican
machine that would go of itself, a Newtonian contraption that would check and
balance powers so effectively that the republic's continuation would be
assured.01 All later generations have to do is stick to the framers' design and all
will be well.
This was always a pipe dream. The framers did not think themselves so
omniscient. They knew the history of republics, their frailty and fragility; and
they knew their own shortcomings as fallible human beings. Above all, they
understood that in the long run no republic can survive without political faith,
without the dedication of each generation of its citizens to the public good, and
without the continual maintenance of institutions of civil society-including
media and educational systems-that support and nourish self-governance.
Over two centuries later, we likewise understand that the machine will not go
of itself. It has taken-and will take-the efforts of many people to oppose
recurring threats to our democracy and to restore trust in our institutions when our
political faith is challenged. What constitutional structure can do is make these
tasks easier or harder to achieve. That is why the study of constitutional structure,
and what you have called the constitution of settlement, is so important.
The American Constitution failed once before, in 1860. It might fail again.
But over the years, from the founding to the present, Americans have built their
Constitution with the possibility of failure in mind. They have sought to
accommodate and incorporate change while limiting the number of constitutional
failures-or, at the very least minimizing the effects of constitutional failure so
that Americans can rebound from it. The framers knew that no constitution is
perfect, and that no republic lasts forever. Whether our Constitution works well
or badly can only be tested through time and experience. We have come upon
such a test right now.
Your devoted friend,
Jack
301. See MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD Go OF ITSELF: THE CONSTITUTION IN
AMERICAN CULTURE 18-19 (1986) (quoting James Russell Lowell's 1888 speech to the Reform
Club ofNew York). Lowell, it should be noted, warned against the "complacency" ofthe metaphor.
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